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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     ince the 1970s, the law of armed conflict and international human rights 
law have been locked into a gradual process of convergence.1 One of the 
earliest outcomes of the rapprochement between these two branches of 
international law was the revision of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 by 
                                                                                                                      
1. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (2000). Scholarship on the relationship between the two 
legal regimes is extensive. For major treatments of the subject, with ample further refer-
ences to the literature, see RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HU-
MANITARIAN LAW (2002); INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Roberta Arnold & Noëlle N. 
R. Quénivet eds., 2008); INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) and RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HU-
MAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (Robert Kolb & Gloria Gaggioli eds., 2013). See 
also Symposium, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Exploring 
Parallel Application, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 306 (2007); Guglielmo Verdirame, Human 
Rights in Wartime: A Framework for Analysis, 13 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 
689 (2008); Michael J. Dennis & Andre M. Surena, Application of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation: The Gap Between Legal 
Theory and State Practice, id. at 714;  Philip Leach, The Chechen Conflict: Analysing the Oversight of 
the European Court of Human Rights, id. at 732; Conor McCarthy, Human Rights and the Laws of 
War under the American Convention on Human Rights, id. at 762; Symposium, The Relationship 
between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, 14 JOURNAL OF 
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 441 (2009). 
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means of their Additional Protocols of 1977.2 The imprint of human rights 
law can be detected across both protocols, most obviously in the form of 
the fundamental guarantees incorporated into Article 75 of Additional Pro-
tocol I (AP I) and Article 4 of Additional Protocol II (AP II).3 In more re-
cent times, international courts and judicial bodies have begun to play a 
leading role in driving forward the convergence between the two regimes. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for exam-
ple, has made a significant contribution to popularizing the notion that the 
two are complementary in nature by drawing attention to their common 
principles and objectives.4 In Coard, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights confirmed that international human rights law applies con-
currently with the law of armed conflict during hostilities, declaring that the 
application of one regime “does not necessarily exclude or displace the 
other.”5 In a string of cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) likewise 
affirmed that the protections offered by human rights conventions do not 
cease in armed conflict.6 As these examples demonstrate, international 
                                                                                                                      
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. See Richard R. Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian 
Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 1, 4–9 (1975). Regarding Additional Protocol II, see also Sylvie Junod, Hu-
man Rights and Protocol II, 23 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 246 (1983). 
3. In this context, it is also worth noting the preamble to Additional Protocol II, 
which recalls that “international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protec-
tion to the human person” in what is the first explicit reference to human rights instru-
ments in an agreement on humanitarian law. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 
1340 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). 
4. E.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 149 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), recognizing that “[b]oth hu-
man rights and humanitarian law focus on respect for human values and the dignity of the 
human person.” On the Tribunal’s caselaw on this area, see Robert Cryer, The Interplay of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Approach of the ICTY, 14 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT 
AND SECURITY LAW 511 (2009). 
5. Bernard Coard et al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Amer. Comm. H.R., Re-
port No. 109/99, ¶ 39 (1999). For an overview of the relevant jurisprudence under the 
Inter-American system, see Christina M. Cerna, The History of the Inter-American System’s 
Jurisprudence as Regards Situations of Armed Conflict, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN-
ITARIAN LEGAL STUDIES 3 (2011). 
6. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 25 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
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courts have become key participants in, and are helping to shape, a global 
dialogue about the interaction between the law of armed conflict and inter-
national human rights law. 
So far, the contribution of the European Court of Human Rights to 
this dialogue has been muted, but has pioneered the extraterritorial applica-
tion of international human rights law for years.7 As a result, the Court has 
received a high number of applications alleging violations of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)8 in circumstances of armed conflict 
and generalized violence. However, until recently, the Court has not 
grasped the opportunity to pronounce on the relationship between the 
Convention and the law of armed conflict. Other than the odd reference to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949,9 the European Court and now-defunct 
European Commission on Human Rights did not find it necessary to rely 
on the law of armed conflict in the numerous cases arising out of the inva-
sion of Northern Cyprus by Turkey in 1974.10 In Al-Jedda, the Court inves-
tigated the scope of the obligations imposed by the law of belligerent oc-
cupation on an occupying power to protect the inhabitants of the occupied 
territory against acts of violence, but did so in the light of the ECHR’s rela-
tionship with Article 103 of the United Nations Charter.11 It did not con-
                                                                                                                      
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 
(July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19). 
7. Scholarship on this subject too is extensive. For major contributions, see EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons Coomans & Menno T. 
Kamminga eds., 2004); MARKO MILANOVIĆ, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HU-
MAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011) and KAREN DA COSTA, 
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2013). 
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
9. See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482, ¶ 313 
(1982), where the European Commission of Human Rights found it unnecessary to exam-
ine the question of a breach of Article 5 of the Convention, which guarantees the freedom 
of liberty, with regard to persons accorded the status of prisoners of war. 
10. E.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Preliminary Objections, 20 
E.H.R.R. 99 (1995). In the case of Jaloud v. The Netherlands, App. No. 47708/08 (2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-148367#{"itemid":["001-
148367"]}, the Court specifically pointed out that it did not have recourse to the concept 
of “occupying power” within the meaning of the law of armed conflict in Loizidou and 
other cases. 
11. Article 103 of the Charter provides as follows: “In the event of a conflict between 
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
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sider whether the law of armed conflict provided a direct legal basis for the 
respondent State’s conduct.12 However, recently the European Court’s ju-
risprudence has reached a turning point. In Hassan v. United Kingdom,13 it 
addressed the relationship between the ECHR and the law of armed con-
flict directly and in express terms for the first time. Hassan is a very signifi-
cant development, as we will discuss in greater detail below.14 In essence, 
the Court has inserted a judge-made exception into the text of Article 5 of 
the Convention to cover the detention of persons in conformity with the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.15 This not only signals a new-found readi-
ness to rely on the law of armed conflict, but also a willingness to give ef-
fect to its rules even where they contradict the terms of the European 
Convention. 
Another significant development under the European Convention sys-
tem has occurred at the domestic level, but points in the opposite direction: 
the judgment delivered by the English High Court in May 2014 in Serdar 
Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence.16 This case represents one of the latest chap-
ters in the steady flow of legal challenges under the Human Rights Act 
199817 arising from the United Kingdom’s involvement in the armed con-
flicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.18 The judgment in Mohammed is of consider-
                                                                                                                      
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.” 
12. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 E.H.R.R. 23 (2011) [herein-
after Al-Jedda, European Court]. See Heike Krieger, After Al-Jedda: Detention, Derogation, and 
an Enduring Dilemma, 50 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 419, 424–32 
(2011); Jelena Pejic, The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda Judgment: The Oversight of 
International Humanitarian Law, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 837 
(2011); Maral Kashgar, The ECtHR's Judgment in Al-Jedda and its Implications for International 
Humanitarian Law, 24 HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT 229 (2011). 
13. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, Sept. 16, 2014, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146501#{"itemid":["001-
146501"]}. For comments, see Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Grand Chamber Judgment in 
Hassan v UK, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-chamber-
judgment-in-hassan-v-uk/. 
14. See infra Section III.C. 
15. This is not uncontroversial. Hassan, supra note 13 (Spano, J., partly dissenting; 
joined by Nicolaou, J.; Bianku, J.; and Kalaydjieva, J.). 
16. Joined cases of Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence and Qasim et al. v. Sec-
retary of State for Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB). 
17. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, available at http://www.legislation.gov. 
uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents. The 1998 Act implements the ECHR in the UK. 
18. Leading cases include R. (Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretary of State for Defence 
[2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 A.C. 153; R. (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] 
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able interest in the UK. For years commentators and politicians have ex-
pressed concerns that legal constraints, in particular those imposed by hu-
man rights law, are undermining the operational effectiveness of the British 
armed forces.19 Mohammed seems to confirm these fears since it suggests 
that international human rights law is the sole international legal framework 
governing the detention of persons, including insurgent fighters, in a non-
international armed conflict (NIAC). However, the judgment is of interest 
not just from a British or purely regional perspective. The interpretation 
and application of the ECHR, whether before domestic authorities or be-
fore the Strasbourg court, has significant ramifications for legal interopera-
bility.20 State parties to the ECHR frequently deploy their troops alongside 
United States, Canadian and other forces in the execution of multinational 
missions. The effectiveness of such operations requires a mutual under-
standing of the contributing States’ varying legal obligations. Moreover, 
Mohammed has major implications for the relationship between international 
human rights law and the law of armed conflict more generally. In short, 
the judgment questions the existence of a legal basis under the law of 
armed conflict for the conduct of status-based operations, that is lethal and 
non-lethal operations targeting individuals based purely on their battlefield 
status,21 in NIACs. The judgment is therefore of broader international sig-
nificance. 
We believe that the restrictive interpretation of the authority to detain 
in NIACs adopted by the High Court in Mohammed is mistaken as a matter 
of law and undesirable as a matter of policy. It drives the convergence be-
tween international human rights law and the law of armed conflict too far. 
                                                                                                                      
UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 [hereinafter Al-Jedda, House of Lords]; R (Smith) v. Secretary 
of State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29, [2011] 1 A.C. 1; and R (Smith) v. Secretary of State 
for Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] 1 A.C. 52. 
19. For an assessment of this debate, see Aurel Sari, The Juridification of the British Armed 
Forces and the European Convention on Human Rights: “Because it’s Judgment that Defeats Us,” avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411070. 
20. See Daniel Bethlehem, The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and In-
ternational Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 2 CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 180, 183–84 (2013). On legal interoperability 
generally, see Charles Garraway, “England Does not Love Coalitions”: Does Anything Change?, in 
THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WEAPONRY AND THE USE OF FORCE 233 (An-
thony M. Helm ed., 2006) (Vol. 82, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies); 
Marten Zwanenburg, International Humanitarian Law Interoperability in Multinational Operations, 
95 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 681 (2013). 
21. On battlefield status, see GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 186–239 (2010). 
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The conduct of status-based operations lies at the “very core” of the law of 
armed conflict,22 both in international and in non-international armed con-
flicts. According primacy to human rights law principles would not only 
subvert the law of armed conflict as it currently stands, but it would also 
frustrate the effective conduct of military operations.23 That, in turn, would 
almost certainly undermine respect for law in war.24 It is therefore impera-
tive to explain why Mohammed is unconvincing. Following a brief review of 
the High Court’s reasoning, we will develop our argument in two steps. 
Section III.A examines the meaning and legal effect of Security Council 
resolutions authorizing the use of “all necessary measures” under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. We argue that the judgment construes the meaning 
of this phrase and the mandate set out in the resolutions relevant to the 
present case too narrowly. Section IV examines the legal basis for status-
based operations under the law of armed conflict applicable in NIACs. We 
suggest that the reasons for excluding an implicit legal basis for detention 
in NIACs are not persuasive, that the authority to target certain persons on 
the basis of their status does in fact imply a corresponding authority to de-
tain them and that this power prevails over any conflicting obligations un-
der the ECHR. Section V contains our conclusions. 
 
II. SERDAR MOHAMMED: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 
 
Between December 2001 and December 2014, UK armed forces partici-
pated in the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
                                                                                                                      
22. Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Hu-
man Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUDIES 
52, 74 (2010). It is in these “hard cases” that the law of armed conflict clashes most clearly 
with the more stringent human rights law standards. See Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the 
Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 2 
(2014). 
23. See Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks: LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 483, 492 (Raul A. 
“Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011) (Vol. 87, U.S. Naval War College 
International Law Studies); Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 795, 837–39 (2011). See also Christopher Greenwood, Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Law: Conflict or Convergence, 43 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 491, 502–3 (2010). 
24. Cf. Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 21 EU-
ROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 20–21 (2010). 
 
 
 
Targeting and Detention in NIACs Vol. 91 
67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in Afghanistan.25 During this period, they were engaged in a multinational 
NIAC pitting the government of Afghanistan and ISAF on one side against 
various insurgent armed groups on the other side.26 Pursuant to the appli-
cable Security Council resolutions, ISAF’s mandate was to assist the Af-
ghan government in maintaining security.27 To this end, the contributing 
States were authorized by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, to “take all necessary measures.”28 However, unlike the 
relevant Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq,29 the Afghanistan 
resolutions did not expressly spell out that contributing States were author-
ized to intern individuals in Afghanistan for imperative reasons of security. 
In practice, ISAF forces have detained many suspected insurgents over the 
                                                                                                                      
25. ISAF was established pursuant to S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 
20, 2001). In 2003, came under NATO command. Its mission terminated at the end of 
2014 in accordance with S.C. Res. 2120, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2120 (Oct. 10, 2013). Since 
January 2015, NATO continues to provide assistance to the Afghan security forces and 
institutions through a follow-on operation called Resolute Support Mission. The new mis-
sion was welcomed, but not mandated, by S.C. Res. 2189, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2189 (Dec. 
12, 2014). We discuss ISAF’s mandate and tasks in greater detail infra Section III.B. 
26. The classification of the conflict(s) in Afghanistan has changed over time. See 
Françoise J. Hampson, Afghanistan, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
CONFLICTS 242 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012). In 2012, the English Court of Appeal 
expressed its “provisional view” that a certificate served by the UK Foreign Secretary stat-
ing that the conflict constituted a NIAC was conclusive of this fact. R. v. Gul (Moham-
med), [2012] EWCA (Crim) 280, [22]; upheld by the Supreme Court in R. v. Gul (Mo-
hammed), [2013] UKSC 64, [2013] 3 W.L.R. 1207, without considering the issue. 
27. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 25, ¶ 1, authorized the establishment of “an Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance 
of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as 
well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.” Since 
then, the Security Council renewed and expanded ISAF’s mandate on several occasions. 
For an overview, see Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 30–33. 
28. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 25, ¶ 3. This authorization was repeated in all successive 
resolutions extending ISAF’s authorization. See also Military Technical Agreement between 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Af-
ghanistan art. IV(2),  Jan. 4, 2002, reprinted as an annex to U.N. Doc. S/2002/117 (Jan. 25, 
2002) (which confers upon the ISAF Commander the “authority, without interference or 
permission, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use 
of military force, to protect the ISAF and its Mission”). 
29. According to a letter from U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the President 
of the Security Council, the functions of the Multinational Force in Iraq included “intern-
ment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security.” S.C. Res. 1546, annex, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004). Resolution 1546 affirmed the mandate of the 
Multinational Force in Iraq on the basis of this letter. 
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years.30 Under ISAF’s standard operating procedures, such detainees were 
to be transferred into the custody of the Afghan authorities, and into the 
Afghan criminal justice system, within the timeframe of 96 hours.31 The 
only exception foreseen to this “96-hour rule” was in cases where deten-
tion for a longer period of time was deemed necessary in order to affect the 
release or transfer of the detainee in safe circumstances.32 Dissatisfied with 
the operational difficulties these strict arrangements presented, on Novem-
ber 9, 2009, the UK adopted a “national policy caveat” to the 96-hour rule 
which permitted, in exceptional circumstances, extended detention for the 
purposes of obtaining significant new intelligence.33 
During a military operation in northern Helmand on April 7, 2010, UK 
armed forces captured Serdar Mohammed, a suspected Taliban command-
er. In accordance with the national detention principles now applied by 
British forces, UK ministers approved Mr. Mohammed’s continued deten-
tion beyond 96 hours, by a further twenty-five days, for the purpose of in-
terrogation. He was then held for an additional eighty-one days—a logisti-
cal extension—during which time the Afghan authorities were unable to 
accept his transfer due to prison overcrowding. In total, Mr. Mohammed 
was detained by UK armed forces for 110 days at UK bases at Camp Bas-
tion and Kandahar Airfield. On July 25, 2010, he was transferred to the 
custody of the Afghan authorities. He was subsequently prosecuted, con-
victed and, following an appeal to the Afghan Supreme Court, sentenced to 
ten years imprisonment.  
Mr. Mohammed then brought a civil damages claim against the UK 
                                                                                                                      
30. ISAF Standard Operating Procedures for Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel 
identified three specific grounds for detention. Namely where detention is necessary for: 
(i) ISAF force protection; (ii) self-defense of ISAF or its force; or (iii) accomplishment of 
the ISAF mission. See International Security Assistance Force, SOP 632, Standard Operat-
ing Procedures for Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel ¶ 4 (2006), quoted in Mohammed, 
supra note 16, ¶ 35. 
31.  “The current policy for ISAF is that detention is permitted for a maximum of 96 
hours after which time an individual is either to be released or handed into the custody of 
the [Afghan authorities].” Id., ¶ 5. 
32. Id. 
33. The Secretary of State for Defense stated “in exceptional circumstances, detaining 
individuals beyond 96 hours can yield vital intelligence that would help protect our forces 
and the local population—potentially saving lives.” Written Ministerial Statement in Par-
liament (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200 
809/cmhansrd/cm091109/wmstext/91109m0001.htm#column_5. The reasons justifying 
the adoption of this caveat and the operation of the British detention policy are set out in 
detail in Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 38–53. 
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Secretary of State for Defence before the High Court of Justice of England 
and Wales. He argued, inter alia, that his detention constituted a violation of 
his right to liberty and security under Article 5 of the ECHR. In May 2014, 
over the course of a tightly-argued judgment running well over one hun-
dred pages, Mr Justice Leggatt (hereinafter “Leggatt J”) rejected the re-
spondent’s various preliminary objections and held that Mr. Mohammed’s 
continued detention after 96 hours amounted to a breach of Afghan law 
and Article 5 of the Convention. He therefore had an “enforceable right” 
to compensation under the Human Rights Act 1998. This conclusion was 
underpinned by four essential findings. 
First, as a detainee, the UK exercised effective control and authority 
over Mr. Mohammed such as to bring him within its jurisdiction within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR.34 The Convention therefore applied to 
his detention in Afghanistan and the UK was under an obligation to ensure 
that he enjoyed the benefit of the rights and freedoms set out in the Con-
vention.  
Second, Mr. Mohammed’s detention was attributable to the UK and 
not to the UN, as the government had claimed.35 While the Security Coun-
cil exercised effective control over ISAF in general terms, Mr. Moham-
med’s detention had been authorized by the UK as a matter of national 
policy outside the ISAF chain of command. Responsibility for his deten-
tion therefore lay with the UK. 
Third, Article 5 of the ECHR was not displaced by virtue of the com-
bined effect of the Security Council resolutions authorizing the deployment 
                                                                                                                      
34. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 116–48. Article 1 of the ECHR provides that its Con-
tracting Parties “shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention.” The establishment of jurisdiction over a person 
therefore operates as a threshold criterion triggering the applicability of the substantive 
obligations set out in the Convention. Detention is one of the core examples of the per-
sonal model of jurisdiction which were identified by the European Court in Al-Skeini v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 E.H.R.R. 18, ¶ 136 (2011). 
35. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 158–87. See also Lord Astor of Hever (Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence), House of Lords Debates, columns 416–17 
(Nov. 7, 2013), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhan 
srd/text/131107-0003.htm. In making this argument, the government relied on the much 
criticized judgment of the European Court in Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. 
France, Germany and Norway, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 E.H.R.R. 10 (2007). For a 
critical comment on the Court’s reasoning in that case, see Aurel Sari, Jurisdiction and Inter-
national Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases, 8 HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 151 (2008). 
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of ISAF and Article 103 of the UN Charter.36 Leggatt J accepted that he 
was bound by the House of Lords’ finding in Al-Jedda that Article 103 of 
the Charter includes authorizations as well as obligations imposed by bind-
ing Security Council resolutions.37 However, in the present case, the appli-
cable Security Council resolutions authorized ISAF to detain individuals 
only for such time as it was necessary to transfer them into the custody of 
the Afghan authorities. Since such limited powers of detention were com-
patible with the ECHR, no conflict arose between the Convention and 
those resolutions. 
Fourth, Leggatt J concluded that the rules of the law of armed conflict 
applicable in NIACs merely recognize and regulate, but do not authorize, 
detention.38 This conclusion was based on three main arguments. First, 
Leggatt J found that the applicable treaty rules confer no legal authority on 
States to detain persons in a NIAC either in express terms or by implica-
tion.39 Second, he rejected the government’s argument that the authority to 
kill under the law of armed conflict implies an authority to capture and de-
tain on security grounds.40 Finally, he found no evidence that a power to 
detain on security grounds forms part of customary international law.41 In 
the absence of any rule authorizing detention in a NIAC either expressly or 
by implication, Leggatt J concluded that there was no conflict between the 
law of armed conflict and Article 5 of the ECHR. Therefore, there was no 
room for the argument that Article 5 was displaced or qualified by the law 
of armed conflict in the present case.42 However, he went further, suggest-
ing obiter that even if such an obligation did exist; it would not prevail over 
the requirements of Article 5. In his view, “the only way in which the Eu-
ropean Court or a national court required to apply Convention rights can 
hold that IHL prevails over Article 5 is by applying the provisions for der-
ogation contained in the Convention itself, and not by invoking the princi-
ple of lex specialis.”43 
Leggatt J must be commended for a careful and meticulous engage-
                                                                                                                      
36. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 188–227. 
37. Al-Jedda, House of Lords, supra note 18, ¶¶ 26–39. By contrast, the European 
Court had held, without elaborating, that Article 103 of the Charter is confined to strict 
obligations. See Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 109. 
38. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 228–68. 
39. Id., ¶¶ 234–51. 
40. Id., ¶ 253. 
41. Id., ¶ 254. 
42. Id., ¶ 293. 
43. Id., ¶ 284. 
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ment with what is a difficult area of international law. It is important to 
underline that his reasoning is not confined to the narrow facts of the case. 
The judgment rejects the existence of a legal basis in the law of armed con-
flict for security detention in NIACs with general effect. Moreover, the 
same logic also denies the existence of a legal basis for other status-based 
operations in a NIAC, including lethal targeting. Ultimately, however, the 
reasoning is not convincing. The analysis of the meaning and effect of the 
relevant Security Council resolutions and of the applicable rules of the law 
of armed conflict is deeply problematic. Moreover, the weight placed on 
derogations must be reassessed in light of the European Court’s judgment 
in Hassan. We will now turn to examine these questions in greater detail. 
 
III. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 
 
In the Al-Jedda case, the House of Lords and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights disagreed over the meaning and effect of Article 103 of the UN 
Charter. The terms of Article 103 are quite narrow. The provision provides 
that UN member States’ obligations under the UN Charter prevail over 
their obligations under any other international agreement in the case of a 
conflict between the two sets of obligations.44 Since the wording of Article 
103 only refers to “obligations,” it is not immediately clear whether the 
provision applies to authorizations to take enforcement measures issued by 
the Security Council in resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Char-
ter.45 Delivering the majority judgment in the House of Lords, Lord Bing-
ham held that such authorizations were covered by Article 103.46 The pro-
                                                                                                                      
44. See supra note 11. 
45. The scope of Article 103 is a matter of debate in the literature. See Robert Kolb, 
Does Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations Apply only to Decisions or also to Authoriza-
tions Adopted by the Security Council?, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES 
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 21 (2004); Rain Liivoja, The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the 
United Nations Charter, 57 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 583 
(2008); Johann Ruben Leiæ & Andreas Paulus, Article 103, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 2110 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
46. Al-Jedda, House of Lords, supra note 18, ¶¶ 26–39. On these points, see Christian 
Tomuschat, R (On the Application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence: Human 
Rights in a Multi-Level System of Governance and the Internment of Suspected Terrorists, 9 MEL-
BOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 391, 400–3 (2008); Aurel Sari, The Al-Jedda 
Case before the House of Lords, 13 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 181, 185–
91 (2009); Francesco Messineo, The House of Lords in Al-Jedda and Public International Law: 
Attribution of Conduct to UN-Authorized Forces and the Power of the Security Council to Displace 
Human Rights, 56 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 35, 47–58 (2009). 
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vision had to be interpreted broadly: while the Security Council is unable to 
compel States to participate in military operations authorized under Chap-
ter VII, States which take up such authorizations are bound to carry out the 
mandate they voluntarily accepted. Since Security Council Resolution 1546 
authorized the UK to exercise its powers of detention in Iraq where this 
was necessary for imperative reasons of security,47 it followed that this au-
thorization prevailed over any conflicting obligations arising under Article 
5 of the European Convention.48 However, when the Al-Jedda case came to 
Strasbourg, the European Court took a different view and decided that 
Resolution 1546 did not impose an obligation to detain. According to the 
Court, in the absence of clear and explicit language to the contrary, a pre-
sumption must exist that the Security Council does not intend to place UN 
member States under an obligation to act contrary to their commitments 
under international human rights law, including the ECHR.49 Since in the 
European Court’s view such language was absent from Resolution 1546, 
the latter did not displace the UK’s obligations under the Convention by 
virtue of Article 103.50 
In the present case, the government relied on the reasoning of the 
House of Lords to argue that Security Council Resolution 1890,51 which 
provided the legal basis for ISAF at the time, did impose an obligation to 
detain Serdar Mohammed. In so far as this obligation was incompatible 
with Article 5 of the ECHR, the government submitted that the doctrine of 
precedent bound the High Court to follow the House of Lords, rather than 
the European Court, and declare that Resolution 1890 displaced Article 5. 
This argument set the High Court at odds with the European Court. Leg-
gatt J resolved this predicament rather elegantly by distinguishing the pre-
sent case from Al-Jedda. As he rightly pointed out, the fact that Resolution 
1546 incorporated an express reference to the power to detain was key in 
persuading the House of Lords in Al-Jedda to accept that the Security 
Council imposed an obligation on the UK to detain individuals for security 
reasons in Iraq.52 Since the reasoning hinged on the existence of such a ref-
                                                                                                                      
47. See supra note 29. 
48. Al-Jedda, House of Lords, supra note 18, ¶ 39. 
49. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶¶ 102, 105. For strong support for this 
presumption, see Marko Milanović, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121, 137–38 (2012). 
50. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 109. 
51. S.C. Res. 1890, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1890 (Oct. 8, 2009). 
52. See supra note 29. 
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erence, so did its value as a binding precedent. Unlike Resolution 1546, nei-
ther Security Council Resolution 1890 nor any of the earlier resolutions on 
ISAF made an explicit reference to the power to detain. Accordingly, Leg-
gatt J concluded that the High Court was not bound by the interpretation 
of Resolution 1546 adopted by the House of Lords in Al-Jedda, but was 
free to assess the meaning of Resolution 1890 independently and on its 
own terms.53   
In interpreting Resolution 1890, Leggatt J was prepared to accept the 
government’s submission that the power to detain was implicit in its terms, 
but only subject to the following qualification: 
 
I accept this argument so far as it goes. In particular, I accept that the 
UNSCRs relating to Afghanistan were plainly intended to authorise the 
use of lethal force at least for the purposes of self-defence. I also accept 
that in these circumstances it must be the case that ISAF personnel were 
authorised to take the lesser step of accepting the surrender of individuals 
who were believed to pose an imminent threat to them or to the civilian 
population. I see no necessary implication, however, that this authorisa-
tion was intended to give ISAF a power to continue to hold individuals in 
detention outside the Afghan criminal justice system after they had been 
arrested and therefore ceased to be an imminent threat.54 
 
Accordingly, Leggatt J held that there was no conflict between Resolu-
tion 1890 and Article 5 of the Convention. This interpretation is too nar-
row. It misapprehends the meaning of the phrase “all necessary measures,” 
applies the presumption of human rights-conformity established by the 
European Court in Al-Jedda too rigidly and misreads the scope of ISAF’s 
mandate under the relevant Security Council resolutions. 
 
A. All Necessary Measures 
 
In construing the meaning of the words “all necessary measures” used in 
Resolution 1890, Leggatt J proceeded on the basis that in Al-Jedda the 
House of Lords did not decide that this phrase carried an “established or 
conventional meaning” whenever it was used by the Security Council.55 
This is of course correct, inasmuch as the House of Lords indeed did not 
define the meaning of the phrase. The High Court therefore was not 
                                                                                                                      
53. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 217. 
54. Id., ¶ 219. 
55. Id., ¶ 214. 
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bound by any precedent on this point. However, this does not mean that 
the formula “all necessary measures” has not acquired a sufficiently precise 
meaning within the Security Council’s practice. On the contrary, its mean-
ing is too well-established for domestic courts to overlook.56 
 
1. The Meaning of the Phrase 
 
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council enjoys the au-
thority to adopt enforcement measures.57 The original intention was that 
such measures were to be carried out by the UN directly, relying on mili-
tary assets and forces made available to it pursuant to Article 43 of the 
Charter.58 However, this scheme was never implemented.59 Instead, the Se-
curity Council has relied on alternative arrangements; in particular coali-
tions of the willing authorized to act on its behalf.60 Although this practice 
                                                                                                                      
56. Indeed, the formula has been described as the example “par excellence” of a 
shared understanding embedded in the Security Council’s interpretative practice. See 
Efthymios Papastavridis, Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII in the 
Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis, 56 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 83, 
101 (2007). 
57. See ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECU-
RITY COUNCIL (2004); THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVO-
LUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008); AL-
EXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, COLLECTIVE SECURITY 188 (2011). 
58. See Nico Krisch, Article 43, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COM-
MENTARY, supra note 45, at 1351. For a comparison of the original intentions of the draft-
ers and the subsequent practice of the Security Council, see Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., The Secu-
rity Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 506 (1995). 
59. However, proposals to revive this scheme are made on a regular basis. See, e.g., 
James E. Rossman, Article 43: Arming the United Nations Security Council, 27 NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 227 (1994). For an over-
view of such efforts, see Adam Roberts, Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical History, 
in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 57, at 99. 
60. See Helmut Freudenschuß, Between Unilateralism and Collective Security: Authorizations 
of the Use of Force by the UN Security Council, 5 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 492 (1994); Nigel D. White & Özlem Ülgen, The Security Council and the Decentralised 
Military Option: Constitutionality and Function, 44 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW RE-
VIEW 378 (1997); DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS 
CHAPTER VII POWERS (1999); Nils Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Prac-
tice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing,” 
11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 541 (2000). 
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raises various difficulties,61 it is now settled and accepted as a matter of 
law.62 As part of this practice, the Security Council has employed the phrase 
“all necessary means” or “all necessary measures” to authorize States to act 
in the implementation of Chapter VII.63 Although the phrase is not free 
from ambiguities,64 three aspects are nevertheless beyond doubt. 
First, by authorizing States to take “all necessary measures,” the Securi-
ty Council is delegating its own powers under Chapter VII.65 Chapter VII 
confers upon the Security Council the authority to adopt measures not in-
volving the use of armed forces under Article 41, and measures that do in-
volve reliance on armed forces under Article 42. As far as enforcement ac-
tion under Article 42 is concerned,66 the Security Council is not constrained 
                                                                                                                      
61. One such difficulty concerns the need for sufficient oversight by the Security 
Council. See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authori-
zations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 124 (1999); Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization: International Law 
and the Use of Force against Iraq, 13 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2002). 
Another difficulty concerns the proper attribution of internationally wrongful conduct 
carried out by armed forces acting pursuant to a Security Council mandate. In addition to 
the authorities cited in supra note 35, see Paolo Palchetti, The Allocation of Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts Committed in the Course of Multinational Operations, 95 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 727 (2013). 
62. Cf. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Char-
ter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 167 (July 20) (“It cannot be said that the Charter 
has left the Security Council impotent in the face of an emergency situation when agree-
ments under Article 43 have not been concluded.”). See also Nico Krisch, Article 42, in THE 
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 1330, 1337–38. 
63. Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework, in THE CHARTER 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 1237, 1264 [hereinafter 
Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII]. 
64. Nabil Hajjami, Que Signifie l’Expression « Prendre Toutes les Mesures Nécessaires » dans la 
Pratique du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, 47 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATION-
AL 232, 233 (2013). 
65. See SAROOSHI, supra note 60, at 142–284. This point is sometimes misunderstood. 
In Al-Jedda, for example, the majority in the House of Lords took the view that the Securi-
ty Council resolutions authorizing the deployment of the Multinational Force in Iraq did 
not involve a delegation of the Security Council’s powers. See Al-Jedda, House of Lords, 
supra note 18, ¶ 23. See also Keir Starmer, Responsibility for Troops Abroad: UN Mandated Forces 
and Issues of Human Rights Accountability, 3 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 318, 
335–36 (2008). But this view is mistaken. See SAROOSHI, supra note 60, at 13; Sari, supra 
note 46, at 193–94. 
66. On the nature of action taken under Article 42 of the Charter, see Certain Expenses, 
supra note 62, at 164–65. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision 
on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 31, 33 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
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to act in self-defense as States are under Article 51, but may deploy armed 
forces for the far broader purpose of maintaining or restoring international 
peace and security. The point is illustrated by Security Council Resolution 
678 adopted in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 
1990.67 Famously, Resolution 678 not only recognized the right of individ-
ual and collective self-defense, but also authorized the use of “all necessary 
means” to restore international peace and security in the area.68 As this ex-
ample demonstrates, the phrase “all necessary measures” is capable of cov-
ering the entire spectrum of enforcement authority enjoyed by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, including the authority to use force in the in-
terests of international peace and security for purposes beyond individual 
or collective self-defense within the meaning of Article 51. 
Second, it is also evident that the Security Council does not authorize 
the full range of its enforcement powers every time it employs the phrase 
“all necessary measures.” This follows from the very language used, since it 
permits only those measures which are necessary. What is necessary depends 
in each particular case on the specific mandate, its general context and any 
other conditions laid down in the resolution concerned.69 The level and 
type of force entailed by the phrase “all necessary measures” is therefore 
highly contextual. For example, in Security Council Resolution 1973,70 the 
Council authorized the use of all necessary measures “to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya,” while at the same time expressly excluding “a foreign occupa-
tion force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”71 
Third, subject to the foregoing point, the phrase “all necessary 
measures” is nevertheless meant to permit the use of some military force in 
the implementation of the mandate.72 Whenever the Security Council limits 
                                                                                                                      
67. S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
68. Id., ¶ 2. For a critical assessment of the scope of this authorization, see Burns H. 
Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 
85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 516, 525–28 (1991). 
69. Cf.  Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08, 56 E.H.R.R. 18, ¶¶ 175, 177 (2013). 
See also Hajjami, supra note 64, at 250–55. 
70. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Feb. 26, 2011).  
71. On the scope of the authorization, see Chris De Cock, Operation Unified Protector 
and the Protection of Civilians in Libya, 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 213, 217–19 (2011). 
72. This is evident from its drafting history. See Christopher Greenwood, New World 
Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 MODERN LAW REVIEW 153, 166 
(1992). As Professor Dinstein notes, the phrase has become “the common euphemism for 
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itself to adopting measures under Article 41, it specifically identifies the 
measures to be taken. By contrast, it routinely uses the generic phrase “all 
necessary measures” to authorize enforcement action under Article 42. In-
deed, the wording of the phrase echoes the language of that provision.73 In 
some cases, the mandate may not require the use of lethal force beyond 
what is permissible for individual self-defense and law enforcement pur-
poses. However, it is notable that even in such cases it is taken for granted 
that the use of lethal force is authorized to ensure the mission’s freedom of 
movement in order to accomplish its mandate.74 Although such a concept 
of “active” or “extended” self-defense75 is not necessarily incompatible 
with the strict requirements governing the use of lethal force under interna-
tional human rights law,76 it does stretch the boundaries of those require-
ments close to their breaking point.77 In other cases, such as Security 
Council Resolutions 678 and 1973, the mandate clearly envisages the use of 
lethal force beyond what would be permissible for the purposes of individ-
ual self-defense and domestic law enforcement. Consequently, while it is 
not inconceivable that a mandate authorizing the use of “all necessary 
measures” can be carried out strictly within the confines of international 
                                                                                                                      
the use of force.” YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 327 (5th 
ed. 2011). However, the connection between the phrase and the use of force was em-
ployed before the 1990s. See Hajjami, supra note 64, at 235–37. 
73. Article 42 of the Charter thus permits the Security Council to “take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security” (emphasis added). 
74. Rob McLaughlin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Use of Lethal Force When Operating 
under a United Nations Security Council Chapter VII Mandate Authorising “All Necessary Means,” 
12 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 389, 410–13 (2007). 
75. See Hans F. R. Boddens Hosang, Force Protection, Unit Self-Defence, and Extended Self-
Defence, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
415, 424 (Dieter Fleck & Terry D. Gill eds., 2010). 
76. Cf. Nigel D. White, Security Council Mandates and the Use of Lethal Force by Peacekeepers: 
What Place for the Laws of War?, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAWS OF WAR: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR PETER ROWE 95, 109–10 (Caroline Harvey, James 
Summers & Nigel D. White eds., 2014). 
77. See Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of 
Force and Fire-arms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, 
at 112, ¶ 9 (1990) (“intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly una-
voidable in order to protect life”). 
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human rights law,78 frequently this is not the case. In such circumstances, 
pursuant to Article 103 of the Charter, the Security Council resolutions 
concerned provide States implementing the mandate with a legal basis to 
act contrary to their international human rights law obligations.79 
 
2. The Requirement of Clear and Explicit Language 
 
In line with the foregoing, the European Court in Al-Jedda accepted in 
principle that the Security Council may compel States to act in contraven-
tion of their obligations under the ECHR and that in such cases their Char-
ter obligations prevail over their obligations under the Convention.80 How-
ever, the Court also held, correctly, that such an outcome does not arise 
lightly, since the Security Council must be presumed not to intend to im-
pose obligations on States in breach of fundamental human rights.81 Yet 
how does one determine whether the Security Council has acted contrary 
to that presumption? According to the European Court, the presumption is 
reversed only where the Council uses “clear and explicit” language to this 
effect.82 
As regards the requirement of “explicit” language, we must remember 
that the European Court is guided in the interpretation of Security Council 
resolutions by the principles laid down by the ICJ.83 These principles draw 
inspiration from the rules of treaty interpretation found in Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.84 A Security 
Council resolution must be interpreted not only with reference to its terms, 
                                                                                                                      
78. Strictly within the confines of international human rights law here means without 
having recourse to derogations or the principle of lex specialis to displace conflicting human 
rights obligations. 
79. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in 
the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
361, 370–72 (2000). 
80. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 101. The Court’s substantive analysis of 
the relevant resolutions would have been utterly pointless if it had not accepted that Arti-
cle 103 of the Charter could, in principle, have this effect. This is so notwithstanding the 
fact that the Court’s analysis may have been aimed to avoid the actual application of Arti-
cle 103. See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Collective Security and Human Rights, in HIERARCHY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 61 (Erika De Wet & Jure 
Vidmar eds., 2012). 
81. Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII, supra note 63, at 1265–66. 
82. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 102. 
83. Id., ¶ 76. 
84. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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but also in the light of “all circumstances that might assist in determining 
the legal consequences of the resolution.”85 More recently, the ICJ added 
that the interpretation of resolutions may also require an analysis of 
“statements by representatives of members of the Security Council made at 
the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the Security Council on the 
same issue, as well as the subsequent practice of relevant United Nations 
organs and of States affected by those given resolutions.”86 Bearing in mind 
this guidance, Security Council resolutions authorizing “all necessary 
measures” must be interpreted in the light of the role and meaning that this 
phrase has acquired in the implementation of Chapter VII. Practice shows 
that the Security Council employs the formula to authorize the use of lethal 
force in excess of what is permitted as a matter of international human 
rights law, typically without using more express language to qualify or dis-
place the human rights obligations of the States acting pursuant to such 
Chapter VII mandates. Under these circumstances, the use of the phrase 
“all necessary measures” must be understood to satisfy the European 
Court’s requirement for “explicit” language. To insist on further express 
language not only contradicts the consistent and well-established practice 
of the Council and the member States of the UN in the interpretation and 
implementation of the Charter,87 but it would also see the European Court 
or domestic courts seeking to place conditions upon the Security Council 
which they have no authority to impose. Moreover, such an approach is 
impractical, as it would require the Security Council to spell out in advance 
each element of the authorization or amend the enabling resolution in or-
                                                                                                                      
85. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advi-
sory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21). See also Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of 
Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 73 
(1998); Papastavridis, supra note 56, 89–111. 
86. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 94 (July 22). 
87. This practice would appear to qualify without too much difficulty as “subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties re-
garding its interpretation” within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties Article 31(3)(b). On the criteria of “subsequent practice” within the meaning of 
Article 31(3)(b), see WOLFRAM KARL, VERTRAG UND SPÄTERE PRAXIS IM VÖLKERRECHT: 
ZUM EINFLUSS DER PRAXIS AUF INHALT UND BESTAND VÖLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRÄ-
GE 184–95 (1983); ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 165–67 
(2007); RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 225–45 (2010). 
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der to cater to constantly evolving circumstances.88 
As regards the requirement for the use of “clear” language, the nature 
and level of force entailed by an authorization to use “all necessary 
measures” must be determined with reference to the express terms of the 
relevant resolution, as interpreted in the light of the factors identified by 
the ICJ. For example, the nature and level of force authorized by Resolu-
tion 678 has to be determined in the light of the preceding decisions of the 
Security Council on the same subject, including Resolutions 660 and 662.89 
In those instruments, the Security Council condemned Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait as a breach of international peace and security, demanded that Iraq 
withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces, and expressed its 
determination to bring the occupation of Kuwait to an end and restore the 
authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait. The language of these 
resolutions clearly establishes that Resolution 678 was meant to authorize a 
degree of force which exceeded the limits of law enforcement and thus the 
confines of international human rights law.90 Interpreting that authorization 
subject to, for example, the requirements of Article 2 of the ECHR would 
have been grossly inadequate and would have failed to give effect to the 
Security Council’s intention to “secure full compliance with its decisions.”91 
Such a narrow approach would contradict the interpretative principles es-
tablished by the ICJ, as accepted by the European Court, and defy the “im-
perative nature” of the Security Council’s responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security.92 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
88. It is not the Security Council’s practice to identify the individual elements of the 
authorization. For an exception, see S.C. Res. 169, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/169 (Nov. 24, 
1961). 
89. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990). 
90. See Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?, 85 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 506, 514 (1991), who suggests that the 
actions contemplated included “whatever attacks against Iraq were reasonably necessary to 
attain the end: i.e., bombing and other attacks on troops, installations, and military equip-
ment in Iraq as well as Kuwait.” 
91. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 67, pmbl. para. 4. See also ALEXANDER ORAKHELASH-
VILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) 
(“[t]he effective interpretation of Security Council resolutions follows from the need to 
give proper effect to the will of and agreement within the Security Council”). 
92. Behrami, supra note 35, ¶ 148. 
 
 
 
Targeting and Detention in NIACs Vol. 91 
81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. ISAF’s Mandate 
 
Armed with these considerations, we can now turn to the Security Council 
resolutions governing the activities of ISAF at the time of Mr. Moham-
med’s detention. Leggatt J held that these instruments authorized ISAF to 
exercise powers of detention solely for the purpose of accepting the sur-
render of individuals believed to constitute an imminent threat and while 
pending their release or transfer to the Afghan criminal justice system.93 
Leggatt J was led to this conclusion by three considerations. 
 
1. Respect for Sovereignty 
 
First, he declared that ISAF’s powers of detention were limited because its 
mandate was confined to assisting the Afghan government in the mainte-
nance of security.
94
 In support of this point, he noted that the applicable 
Security Council resolutions expressly affirmed the “sovereignty, independ-
ence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan” and recognized that “respon-
sibility for providing security and law and order throughout Afghanistan 
resided with the Afghan authorities.”
95
  
Care must be taken not to misread these pronouncements. In Resolu-
tion 1973, the Security Council employed nearly identical language to af-
firm its commitment to Libya’s sovereignty and reiterate that the responsi-
bility to protect the civilian population lay with the Libyan authorities.96 
Surely, the Council recalled these principles not to detract from the man-
date laid down in Resolution 1973, but restated them precisely because the 
mandate authorized measures which otherwise would negate them.97 For 
                                                                                                                      
93. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 219. 
94. Id., ¶ 220. 
95. E.g., S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 25, pmbl. paras. 4, 9; S.C. Res. 1510, pmbl. paras. 
2, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1510 (Oct. 13, 2003). 
96. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 70, pmbl. paras. 4, 20. 
97. This is consistent with the Security Council’s practice in this area. For example, 
S.C. Res. 1894, pmbl. paras. 5, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009) on the protec-
tion of civilians in time of war notes that  
 
States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citi-
zens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant internation-
al law” and reaffirms “that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take 
all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians.”  
 
However, Resolution 1894 goes on to affirm the Security Council’s “willingness to re-
spond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian 
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the same reason, the references to the sovereignty of Afghanistan and the 
primary responsibility of the Afghan authorities for providing security 
should not be read as detracting from ISAF’s mandate, but as affirming 
these principles notwithstanding ISAF’s presence and mission in Afghani-
stan. Accordingly, the nature of ISAF’s mandate cannot be derived from 
these pronouncements, but must be established with reference to the spe-
cific tasks assigned to it in the applicable Security Council resolutions.  
 
2. Authority to Engage in Hostilities 
 
Second, while Leggatt J accepted that the relevant Security Council resolu-
tions conferred a power to detain on ISAF by implication, he took the view 
that “there is nothing in the language of UNSCR 1890 which demon-
strates—let alone in clear and unambiguous terms—an intention to require 
or authorise detention contrary to international human rights law.”
98
 This 
position is open to question. As we discussed earlier, the reference to “all 
necessary measures” in Resolution 1890 and its predecessors constitutes 
explicit language authorizing, in principle, the use of coercive measures in 
excess of what is normally permitted under international human rights law. 
To determine whether or not the implementation of ISAF’s mandate did in 
fact require enforcement action beyond those limits, it is necessary to as-
sess the scope and nature of its tasks in more detail.  
ISAF was established by Security Council Resolution 1386 as the force 
“envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement” in order “to assist the Af-
ghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its sur-
rounding areas.”99 The Bonn Agreement was drawn up in December 2001 
to re-establish the power of the Afghan authorities and pave the way for 
the creation of permanent institutions of government.100 Annex 1 of the 
                                                                                                                      
assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including through the consideration 
of appropriate measures at the Security Council’s disposal in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations” (¶ 4). This reflects the tension between State sovereignty and col-
lective security action addressed in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. See Georg Nolte, Article 
2 (7), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 280, 
301–5. 
98. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 221. 
99. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 25, ¶ 1. 
100. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 5, 2001 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001) 
(containing Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement)). 
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Agreement addressed the need for the deployment of an “International 
Security Force.” It began by underlining that responsibility for providing 
security and law resided with the Afghans themselves.101 To this end, the 
participants in the Bonn talks pledged themselves to do all within their 
means to ensure security and requested the international community to as-
sist the new Afghan authorities “in the establishment and training of new 
Afghan security and armed forces.”102 However, since it was likely to take 
some time before these new forces were fully constituted and functioning, 
the participants requested the Security Council “to consider authorizing the 
early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force” in 
order to “assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surround-
ing areas.”103 
ISAF’s original mandate therefore had two closely connected but dis-
tinct aspects. First, ISAF was mandated to assist the Afghan authorities in 
establishing and training new security forces and in the rehabilitation of 
Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Second, ISAF was also mandated to assist the 
Afghan authorities in the maintenance of security in defined geographical 
areas in the absence of local security forces. Accordingly, ISAF was tasked 
not only to play a supportive role, but also to carry out executive security 
functions of its own.104 Following NATO’s assumption of command over 
ISAF in August 2003, Security Council Resolution 1510 extended ISAF’s 
mandate to areas beyond Kabul and expanded it to include providing “se-
curity assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn 
Agreement.”105 While this enlarged the range of tasks ISAF carried out in 
support of the Afghan authorities, it did not restrict ISAF’s executive func-
tions. On the contrary, their scope and intensity increased. In this respect, 
it is important to bear in mind the context in which ISAF operated. 
All Security Council resolutions concerning ISAF’s mandate promi-
nently recall Resolutions 1368 and 1373 adopted in response to the attacks 
of September 11, 2001.106 These resolutions affirm the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense and affirm the need to combat by all 
                                                                                                                      
101. Id., Annex, ¶ 1. 
102. Id., Annex, ¶¶ 1, 2. 
103. Id., Annex, ¶ 3. 
104. This was underlined by the pledge given by the participants in the Bonn talks to 
“withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which 
the UN mandated force is deployed.” Id., Annex, ¶ 4. 
105. S.C. Res. 1510, supra note 95, ¶ 1. 
106. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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means, in accordance with the UN Charter, threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts.107 Evidently, the Security Council con-
sidered these resolutions relevant to ISAF’s mandate. In fact, Resolution 
1510 called upon ISAF to work in close consultation with the Operation 
Enduring Freedom coalition in the implementation of its tasks, while Reso-
lution 1707 welcomed the increased coordination between ISAF and the 
coalition.108 Moreover, it must be recognized that ISAF operated in the 
context of an ongoing NIAC involving itself and the Afghan authorities on 
one side and insurgents and other opposing forces on the other side.109 
Around the time of Mr. Mohammed’s detention, ISAF’s strength stood at 
close to 150,000 personnel, including around 9,500 British troops.110 Fol-
lowing the adoption of a more robust posture in 2009,111 ISAF’s mission as 
defined by NATO was to conduct “comprehensive, population-centric 
counterinsurgency operations” and support the Afghan authorities “in or-
der to neutralize the enemy, safeguard the people, enable establishment of 
acceptable governance, and provide a secure and stable environment.”112 
Accordingly, at the time of Mr. Mohammed’s capture, ISAF assisted the 
Afghan authorities in re-establishing security in their country by, among 
other things, engaging in the conduct of hostilities in its area of operations. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is entirely unconvincing to construe the 
relevant Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1890, as restrict-
ing the use of force by ISAF to individual or unit-level self-defense and law 
enforcement only. This ignores the fact that the Security Council evidently 
considered ISAF to be involved in an armed conflict. Beginning with Reso-
                                                                                                                      
107. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 106, pmbl. paras. 2, 3; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 106, 
pmbl. paras. 4, 5. 
108. S.C. Res. 1510, supra note 95, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1707, pmbl. para. 10, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1707 (Sept. 12, 2006). See also S.C. Res. 1833, pmbl. para. 19, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1833 (Sept. 22, 2008); S.C. Res. 1890, supra note 51, pmbl. para. 22, ¶ 5.  
109. See supra note 26. 
110. House of Commons Defence Committee, Operations in Afghanistan, Fourth Re-
port of Session 2010–12, at 33–34 (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.public 
ations.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/554.pdf. 
111. See Letter from Stanley A. McChrystal, General, U.S. Army, Commander, United 
States Forces—Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, to 
Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense: COMISAF’s Initial Assessment (Aug. 30, 2009), 
available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment 
_Redacted_092109.pdf.  
112. ISAF OPLAN 38302 (Revision 4, Sept. 25, 2009), quoted in U.S. Department of 
Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 11 (2010), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf. 
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lution 1776, the Security Council started to recall its resolutions on the pro-
tection of civilians in armed conflict and to make reference to the need to 
uphold international humanitarian law.113 In Resolution 1890, it con-
demned “in the strongest terms all attacks, including Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) attacks, suicide attacks and abductions, targeting civilians and 
Afghan and international forces” and stressed the need for sustained inter-
national efforts, including those of ISAF, to address the threat posed by 
the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups.114 It also expressed its 
serious concern with the high number of civilian casualties, recognized the 
additional efforts taken by ISAF and other international forces to minimize 
them, and called for compliance with international humanitarian and hu-
man rights law.115 Given the nature of the threat posed by the insurgency, it 
is unrealistic to suggest that the Security Council did not authorize ISAF to 
address that threat through the conduct of hostilities against the armed 
groups involved. If ISAF had exceeded its mandate in doing so, the Securi-
ty Council would have had ample opportunities to redraw or clarify the 
boundaries of its authorization. It never did so. Instead, the Council con-
sistently welcomed ISAF’s efforts and expanded and extended its mandate 
on successive occasions. 
 
3. Compliance with International Human Rights Law 
 
Finally, Leggatt J also relied on the fact that Resolution 1890 expressly calls 
for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.116 
Two points are worth noting in this respect. First, in calling for compliance 
with these two bodies of law, the Security Council stopped short of declar-
ing that they formally applied in the present context. Evidently, the Council 
must have believed this to be the case; otherwise it would not have invoked 
them. Nonetheless, the application of either body of law to ISAF opera-
tions remained subject to their respective rules governing their applicabil-
                                                                                                                      
113. S.C. Res. 1776, pmbl. paras. 3, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1776 (Sept. 19, 2007). 
114. S.C. Res. 1890, supra note 51, pmbl. paras. 12–14. 
115. Id., pmbl. paras. 15, 16. On civilian causalities during this period, see United Na-
tions Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission, 2010 Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan 
(2011), available at http://www.unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human  
rights/March PoC Annual Report Final.pdf.  
116. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 222. 
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ity.117 Second, the Security Council invoked both humanitarian and human 
rights law, without addressing their relationship. However, simply by leav-
ing this question open, it cannot be presumed that the Security Council 
intended to subject the conduct of military operations by ISAF to the more 
restrictive standards of international human rights law. Indeed, on such a 
view, it would have been superfluous for the Security Council to refer to 
international humanitarian law at all. Moreover, as we found earlier, those 
more restrictive standards would have prevented ISAF from carrying out 
the mandate to its full effect. Consequently, to the extent that the rules of 
the law of armed conflict governing the use of lethal force and other coer-
cive measures against individuals displace or qualify the standards of inter-
national human rights law during armed conflict, the reference in Resolu-
tion 1890 to both bodies of law in fact undermines Leggatt J’s reasoning.   
Overall, the interpretation of ISAF’s mandate adopted by the High 
Court is too restrictive. It is based on the assumption that ISAF was re-
quired to carry out its task in strict conformity with international human 
rights law and limit itself to using lethal force only for the purposes of indi-
vidual self-defense and law enforcement. Our analysis of the Security 
Council’s practice under Chapter VII, as well as the terms and context of 
the resolutions defining ISAF’s mandate, demonstrates that this assump-
tion is mistaken. ISAF was authorized and expected to engage actively in 
armed conflict. This means that it was authorized to operate pursuant to a 
conduct of hostilities paradigm, subject to the rules of the law of armed 
conflict, rather than a law enforcement paradigm.118 Contrary to Leggatt J’s 
conclusions, ISAF’s authority to use lethal force was not limited to target-
ing only individuals who posed an imminent threat. Nor was its authority 
to detain individuals therefore limited to accepting their surrender and neu-
tralizing the imminent threat they posed, pending their release or transfer 
to the Afghan authorities.119 Additionally, in so far as States contributing 
                                                                                                                      
117. For example, nothing suggests that the Security Council intended Resolution 
1890 to extend, through its Chapter VII powers, the application of the ECHR either to 
ISAF as a whole or to the national contingents contributed by the contracting parties of 
the Convention. Had that been the case, it would have been quite superfluous for the 
High Court to consider the extraterritorial applicability of the Convention in the present 
case. See Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 116–48. 
118. On the notion of these paradigms and the difference between them, see NILS 
MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83–90, 243–99 (2008). 
119. Leggatt J accepted that the authority to use lethal force implies an authority to 
capture. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 219. If ISAF was authorized to use lethal force be-
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troops to ISAF acted pursuant to this authorization, it follows from the 
principles accepted by the European Court in Al-Jedda that they carried out 
obligations which prevailed, in accordance with Article 103 of the UN 
Charter, over any conflicting commitments they undertook in the ECHR.  
 
IV.  STATUS-BASED OPERATIONS IN NIACS 
 
As we have just found, Security Council Resolution 1890 had two main 
legal effects. It authorized ISAF to take all necessary measures in order to 
implement its mandate, including the use of lethal force and other restric-
tive measures exceeding the limits of individual self-defense and law en-
forcement. And, in combination with Article 103, this authorization pre-
vailed over the conflicting obligations imposed on the UK by Article 5 of 
the ECHR. The government argued that the same two legal effects also 
flowed from the rules of the law of armed conflict: the law of armed con-
flict provided a legal authority to detain Mr. Mohammed on security 
grounds and that authority displaced or qualified the stricter requirements 
of Article 5 of the Convention. As indicated earlier, Leggatt J dismissed 
both of these arguments. In this Section, we submit that the government’s 
position is the more persuasive one. 
 
A. Treaty Law 
 
Leggatt J relied on a series of arguments to reject the government’s submis-
sions.120 He examined in some detail the treaty rules applicable in NIACs, 
namely Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (CA3) and AP II of 
1977.121 Neither set of rules confers an express authorization upon belliger-
ent parties to detain individuals. Moreover, Leggatt J found that those rules 
also do not provide an implicit legal basis for detention. He offered five 
reasons for this conclusion. 
 
1. Lack of Express Authority 
 
Leggatt J held that it was reasonable to assume that if CA3 and AP II were 
intended to confer an authority to detain persons in a NIAC, they would 
                                                                                                                      
yond the confines of individual self-defense and law enforcement, it follows that it was 
authorized to detain individuals beyond those limits as well. 
120. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 228–68. 
121. Id., ¶¶ 234–51. 
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have done so in express terms, just as Article 21 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention makes express provision for the power to detain prisoners of war 
in an international armed conflict.122 Elsewhere in his judgment, Leggatt J 
himself supplies the reasons why it is not in fact reasonable to make such 
an assumption.123  
As is well known, States have for a long time been reluctant to regulate 
the conduct of hostilities in civil wars as a matter of international law.124 
Their reluctance was motivated to a large extent by a desire not to grant 
any legitimacy and legal recognition to rebels, insurgents and other non-
State actors taking up arms against them.125 That attitude has not changed. 
Consequently, when States eventually agreed to extend the law of armed 
conflict to NIACs, initially in the form of CA3 and later through AP II, 
they did so subject to two key restrictions. First, the treaty rules applicable 
to NIACs were rudimentary compared to the rules applicable in interna-
tional armed conflicts. Second, their primary aim was to offer legal protec-
tions to individuals from the adverse consequences of armed conflict. This 
humanitarian focus was key to securing the adoption of CA3 and AP II 
since the grant of minimum protections to rebels does not entail the grant 
of legitimacy or status.126 By contrast, the conferral of prisoner of war sta-
                                                                                                                      
122. Id., ¶ 242. Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention declares that the “Detain-
ing Power may subject prisoners of war to internment” and goes on to impose various 
conditions on the exercise of this power. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See, similarly, Articles 
42–43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the internment of civilians 
where necessary, including on grounds of security. Convention (IV) Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
123. See Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 245. 
124. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 317–18 (2d 
ed. 2000); LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 49–60, 99–107 (2006); SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, 
THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 9–53 (2012). 
125. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat: Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction 
of War, 43 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 19 (2004). See also Waldemar 
A. Solf, Problems with the Application of Norms Governing Interstate Armed Conflict to Non-
International Armed Conflict, 13 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARA-
TIVE LAW 291, 292–93 (1983); EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF COMBATANTS 
AND INSURGENTS UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 69–74 (2010). 
126. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION 
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 44 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958); COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AU-
GUST 1949, ¶ 4500 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 
1987). 
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tus on rebel fighters would have implied some form of legal recognition 
and therefore remains controversial to this very day.127 Similarly, any at-
tempt to prescribe the grounds for detention in NIACs would have given 
rise to the same controversy. Seen from this perspective, it is not at all rea-
sonable to assume that CA3 and AP II would have spelled out the legal 
basis for detention in express terms. In any event, the fact that they fail to 
do so does not exclude the possibility, either in logic or in law, that interna-
tional law may contain alternative legal bases for detention in NIACs. 
 
2. No Implied Language 
 
In a closely related argument, Leggatt J held that there is nothing in the 
language of CA3 and AP II which suggests that they were meant to confer 
an authority to detain by implication.128 Both sets of rules take for granted, 
as a matter of fact, that in times of armed conflict persons are deprived of 
their liberty. Both therefore accord certain safeguards to such persons 
without, however, providing a legal basis for their detention. This is a plau-
sible interpretation of the terms of CA3 and AP II if viewed in isolation. 
However, the existence of an implicit legal authority to detain must be as-
sessed with reference to the context, object and purpose of CA3 and AP II. 
In any event, even if correct, this interpretation merely posits the absence 
of an implicit legal basis for detention in CA3 and AP II, but once again 
does not rule out the existence of such a legal basis under customary law. 
 
3. Purely Humanitarian Purpose 
 
Leggatt J declared that the “purely humanitarian purpose” pursued by CA3 
and AP II is inconsistent with the idea that they were designed to confer a 
legal power of detention.
129
 There is nothing objectionable about this ar-
gument if it was merely meant to repeat the earlier finding that CA3 and 
AP II grant certain safeguards to detainees without providing a legal basis 
for their detention. However, it is misconceived if it was meant to suggest 
that status-based detention is incompatible with the humanitarian nature of 
                                                                                                                      
127. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 513–26; ELS DEBUF, CAPTURED IN WAR: 
LAWFUL INTERNMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT 451–59 (2013). 
128. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 243. To similar effect, see John Cerone, Jurisdiction and 
Power: The Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict in an 
Extraterritorial Context, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 396, 404 (2007). 
129. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 244. 
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CA3 and AP II. Humanitarian considerations are, of course, at the fore-
front of the law of armed conflict.
130
 Indeed, it is popular nowadays to as-
sume that they are its main purpose.
131
 Writing in 1952, Hersch Lauter-
pacht already advised: 
We shall utterly fail to understand the true character of the law of war un-
less we realize that its purpose is almost entirely humanitarian in the literal 
sense of the word, namely, to prevent or mitigate suffering and, in some 
cases, to rescue life from the savagery of battle and passions. This, and 
not the regulation and direction of hostilities, is its essential purpose.132 
However, contrary to Lauterpacht’s suggestion, humanitarian objec-
tives have never been the sole preoccupation of the law of armed conflict. 
Its other purpose has always been the regulation of hostilities.133 The de-
tailed rules of AP I concerning targeting attest to the fact that rules de-
signed to protect the victims of war coexist with rules designed to regulate 
the conduct of hostilities to this very day.134 Focusing on its humanitarian 
aspects at the expense of its warfighting dimension ignores the dual charac-
ter of the law of armed conflict.135 This approach also overlooks two im-
                                                                                                                      
130. E.g., the famous Martens clause in the preamble of Convention No. II with Re-
spect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 
403. On the uncertain meaning and effect of the clause, see Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens 
Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 37 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 125 
(1997); Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EURO-
PEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (2000); Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, 
Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 78 (2000). 
131. According to the ICJ, at the heart of the principles and rules of the law of armed 
conflict is the “overriding consideration of humanity.” Nuclear Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 95. 
See also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1, Judgment, ¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
132. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRITISH 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 360, 363–64 (1952). 
133. E.g., Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the 
Laws, 31 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 935, 943 (1982); Charles Garraway, “To 
Kill or Not to Kill?”—Dilemmas on the Use of Force, 14 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY 
LAW 499 (2009). 
134. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY 
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOL I (2009); WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 77–116 (2012). 
135. The dual character of the law is reflected in the traditional distinction between 
the rules relating to the protection of the victims of war, known as “Geneva law,” and the 
rules regulating the conduct of hostilities, known as “Hague law.” See François Bugnion, 
Droit de Genève et Droit de La Haye, 83 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 901 
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portant features that distinguish it from international human rights law. 
Not all the rules of the law of armed conflict are humanitarian in their 
nature or origin.136 As is well known, at the heart of the law of armed con-
flict lies a balance between military necessity and humanitarian considera-
tions.137 Whereas international human rights law confers rights and funda-
mental freedoms on every person without distinction and discrimination, 
the level of protection offered by the law of armed conflict to an individual 
depends on his or her legal status on the battlefield.138 By stipulating that 
attacks may only be directed against military objectives, the law of armed 
conflict gives effect to humanitarian imperatives through shielding civilians 
and civilian objects from hostilities.139 However, in the same breath, it also 
recognizes that the use of combat power against combatants and military 
objects is permissible on the basis of their status as military objectives.140 
Status-based detention in armed conflict is therefore perfectly compatible 
with the humanitarian aspirations of the law of armed conflict. 
                                                                                                                      
(2001). With the adoption of AP I, these two strands of the law have become even more 
closely intertwined. See Richard J. Erickson, Protocol I: A Merging of the Hague and Geneva Law 
of Armed Conflict, 19 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 557 (1979); Nuclear 
Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 75. However, this does not mean that “Hague law” has been su-
perseded or abandoned.  
136. G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, ACTA JURIDICA 193, 199–
201 (1979). 
137. E.g., G.I.A.D. Draper, Military Necessity and Humanitarian Imperatives, 12 MILITARY 
LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 129 (1973); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF 
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 4–6 (2d ed. 2010); 
Schmitt, supra note 23; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 34–36 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed. 
2013). Cf. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 2.4.1 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT]. 
138. See Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: The 
Politics of Distinction, 19 MICHIGAN STATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (2011). 
On the status of individuals on the battlefield, see SOLIS, supra note 21, at 186–239. While 
the law of armed conflict thus discriminates between individuals based on their battlefield 
status, it does not discriminate between individuals enjoying the same status. See Jelena 
Pejic, Non-discrimination and Armed Conflict, 83 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS 183 (2001). 
139. See David Kretzmer, Civilian Immunity in War: Legal Aspects, in CIVILIAN IMMUNI-
TY IN WAR 84 (Igor Primoratz ed., 2007). 
140. BOOTHBY, supra note 134, at 60 (“The law of armed conflict and the customary 
law of targeting are rooted in the principle that a distinction must be made throughout the 
conflict between those who may be lawfully attacked and those who must be respected 
and protected.”). 
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Unlike human rights law, the law of armed conflict does not merely 
impose obligations on States. It has occasionally been suggested that this 
branch of international law is prohibitive, not permissive, in nature. Ac-
cording to this view, the law of armed conflict constitutes an elaborate set 
of rules crafted for the purpose of prohibiting the excesses of war by estab-
lishing a minimum level of humanitarian protection, without, however, 
providing any affirmative authorization to engage in warfighting.141 It is 
difficult to reconcile this position with the permissive language found in 
various rules of the law of armed conflict, such as Article 22 of the Hague 
Regulations142 or Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention.143 More fun-
damentally, such a view fails to appreciate the role that the principle of mil-
itary necessity plays in the law of armed conflict. As Nils Melzer has ex-
plained, the “aim of military necessity as a principle of law has always been 
to provide a realistic standard of conduct by permitting those measures of 
warfare that are reasonably required for the effective conduct of hostilities, 
while at the same time prohibiting the infliction of unnecessary suffering, 
injury and destruction.”144 The principle therefore serves both a restrictive 
and a permissive function at the same time. The permissive function was 
expressed by the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the Hos-
tages case as follows: 
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to ap-
ply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of 
the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. In 
general, it sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the 
safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operations. It per-
mits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose 
destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war; 
                                                                                                                      
141. Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 656, 666–69 (Andrew 
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014). 
142. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, annexed 
to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 (“The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the ene-
my is not unlimited.” (emphasis added)). 
143. Supra note 122. In Hassan, the European Court accepted that the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions confer “powers” upon State parties to an international armed 
conflict. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 105. 
144. MELZER, supra note 118, at 279–80. 
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it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger.145 
As a general principle, military necessity it is not sufficiently precise to 
provide detailed guidance on what are permissible aims, means and meth-
ods of warfare, and what are not. Rather, it falls to the positive rules of the 
law of armed conflict, as laid down in the applicable treaties and embodied 
in customary international law, to provide that guidance and thereby give 
military necessity concrete meaning. Military necessity therefore operates as 
a background principle, woven into the fabric of the law of armed conflict 
in two main ways. First, it maintains a degree of flexibility in the application 
of the law by serving as an express exception to specific rules.146 Second, 
and more importantly for our purposes, military necessity feeds into the 
creation of positive rules as a permissive principle.147 Many, though not 
necessarily all, prohibitions of the law of armed conflict contain as their 
flipside varying degrees of permissions.148 To assume that everything which 
is not expressly prohibited in the law of armed conflict is permissible does 
not quite capture the complex interplay between humanitarian considera-
tions and military necessity.149 However, in some cases, permissions are in 
fact implied in the law, even though they may not be stated expressly.150 As 
we saw, the duty of distinction channels lawful violence, exposing military 
objectives to attack while shielding civilians.151 This permissive element of 
the duty of distinction is confirmed by the longstanding, consistent and 
general practice of States of exercising their liberty to conduct status-based 
operations against enemy military objectives within the limits laid down by 
                                                                                                                      
145. United States v. Wilhelm List and Others (The Hostages Case), 8 LAW REPORTS 
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 66 (1949). See also William Gerald Downey Jr., The Law 
of War and Military Necessity, 47 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (1953). 
146. Cf. AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(3). See Emily Camins, The Past as Prologue: The Devel-
opment of the “Direct Participation” Exception to Civilian Immunity, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF THE RED CROSS 853 (2008). For other examples, see Hillaire McCoubrey, The Nature of 
the Modern Doctrine of Military Necessity, 30 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 
215, 229–37 (1991).  
147. Nobuo Hayashi, Military Necessity as Normative Indifference, 44 GEORGETOWN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 675, 717–18 (2013). 
148. Id. at 737–49; Corn, supra note 22, at 92. 
149. As a principle of law, military necessity is not some form of extra-legal freedom. 
Cf. McCoubrey, supra note 146, at 219–21. On different constructions of the term, see 
Nobuo Hayashi, Contextualizing Military Necessity, 27 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW RE-
VIEW 190 (2013). 
150. Id. at 234–35; Hayashi, Military Necessity as Normative Indifference, supra note 147, at 
747–48. 
151. Berman, supra note 125, at 5. 
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the law of armed conflict. Once again, these points underline that an im-
plied authorization for detention in NIACs may well exist in rules of the 
law of armed conflict other than CA3 and AP II. 
 
4. Principle of Equal Application 
 
Leggatt J held that recognizing a legal basis for detention in AP II would 
have entailed extending that authority to dissident and rebel armed groups 
as well, which surely could not have been intended.152 This stretches the 
principle of the equal application of the law of armed conflict too far.153 
The States negotiating the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Addi-
tional Protocols resisted creating the impression that they were recognizing 
any belligerent rights for non-State actors or conferring a belligerent status 
on them. In fact, CA3 explicitly states that its application “shall not affect 
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.” As the commentary on CA3 
explains, the inclusion of this clause was essential to secure its adoption by 
the negotiating States.154 The language, structure and negotiating history of 
CA3 and AP II thus demonstrate that States were not prepared to accord 
the same belligerent status and rights to non-State actors which they them-
selves enjoyed.  
This can mean only one of two things for the principle of equal appli-
cation. First, if the principle demands that all belligerents must enjoy the 
same status and rights and CA3 does not confer the full panoply of bellig-
erent status and rights on non-State actors, then the only logical conclusion 
is that the parties to the Geneva Conventions and AP II gave up their sta-
tus and rights as States and assumed the same status and rights as non-State 
actors. This not only contradicts commonsense, but also the plain language 
of CA3, which declares that it does not affect the legal status of the parties, 
State and non-State alike, to the conflict. In fact, CA3 thereby conserves 
any pre-existing inequality between the belligerent status and rights of State 
and non-State parties to a NIAC. This compels us to adopt a second, nar-
                                                                                                                      
152. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 245. 
153. On the principle, see Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A 
Principle under Pressure, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 931 (2008); Adam 
Roberts, The Principle of Equal Application of the Laws of War, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRI-
ORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 226 (David Rodin & Henry Shue 
eds., 2008). 
154. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 126, at 44. See also 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 126, ¶ 4499.  
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rower reading of the principle of equality: namely, that CA3 and AP II pro-
vide for equality of protection, but not equality of belligerent status and rights, 
between the State and non-State parties to a NIAC.155 Accordingly, the fact 
that CA3 and AP II do not contain an express legal basis for detention 
does not prove that States do not enjoy the authority to detain persons in 
NIACs, nor does the express or implicit existence of such a right for States 
require them, in logic or in law, to extend the same right to non-State ac-
tors.   
 
5. Lack of Procedural Safeguards 
 
Finally, Leggatt J held that in the absence of detailed rules governing “who 
may be detained, on what grounds, in accordance with what procedures or 
for how long,” CA3 and AP II could not possibly have been intended to 
provide for a power to detain.156 Two points are worth noting in this re-
spect.  
First, just because the law of armed conflict does not regulate the exer-
cise of a particular power in great detail does not mean that it does not rec-
ognize the existence of that power at all. Consider the rule in Article 51(3) 
of AP I, whereby civilians enjoy general protection against the dangers aris-
ing from military operations and may not be the object of attack “unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”157 AP I does not 
provide any further guidance as to what direct participation in hostilities 
entails, when exactly it commences and ceases, or how and through what 
procedure an act of direct participation should be identified.158 Yet this lack 
of guidance does not prevent Article 51(3) from rendering such civilians 
                                                                                                                      
155. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 126, ¶ 4458 (“in a 
non-international armed conflict the legal status of the parties involved in the struggle is 
fundamentally unequal”); Berman, supra note 125, at 20, describes this as the “statist and 
governmentalist biases” of the law of armed conflict. 
156. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 126, ¶ 246. It 
should be emphasized that the gap is mainly procedural. The rules governing the treat-
ment of detainees are much more robust. See CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 78–117. 
157. See Camins, supra note 146. 
158. On some of these questions, see Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized 
Armed Groups and the ICRC Direct Participation in Hostilities Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW 
YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 641 (2010); Michael 
N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, id. at 697; 
Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 
id. at 741.  
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liable to lethal attack.  
Second, such regulatory gaps are often filled by other rules of law or by 
authoritative guidance.159 This is not the place to study the rules of interna-
tional law governing the conditions of deprivation of liberty in a NIAC. It 
suffices to note that they include other rules of the law of armed conflict,160 
rules of international human rights law161 and relevant non-binding instru-
ments.162 Although these additional rules may not resolve all questions with 
absolutely certainty,163 they do go a long way towards providing a detailed 
legal framework for detention in NIACs. In the light of these points, Leg-
gatt J’s conclusion that the absence of detailed procedural rules in CA3 and 
AP II “confirms that it is not the purpose of these provisions to establish a 
legal basis for detention” is not persuasive. Nor does the absence of such 
                                                                                                                      
159. In the case of Article 51(3) of AP I, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN 
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTER-
PRETIVE GUIDANCE]. 
160. E.g., rules defining the temporal scope of application of a NIAC. See SIVAKUMA-
RAN, supra note 124, at 252–54. Or rules imported from the law of armed conflict applica-
ble in international armed conflicts by analogy. See, e.g., Knut Dörmann, Detention in Non-
International Armed Conflicts, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 347, 356 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. 
Naval War College International Law Studies). See also Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and 
Safeguards for Internment /Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Vio-
lence, 87 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 375 (2005). 
161. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 347–52 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). See also U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of Person, ¶ 66 (advance unedit-
ed version), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/ 
_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fGC%2f35&Lan
g=en; CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 118–52. 
162. E.g., The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Opera-
tions: Principles and Guidelines (2012), reprinted in 51 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 
1368 (2012), available at http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Pol 
itics-and-diplomacy/Copenhangen%20Process%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf; 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Strengthening Legal Protection for Persons deprived of 
their Liberty in relation to Non-International Armed Conflict (Regional Consultations 2012–13 
Background Paper), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2013/streng then-
ing-legal-protection-detention-consultations-2012-2013-icrc.pdf. 
163. See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contem-
porary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AMERI-
CAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (2011); John B. Bellinger III, Legal Issues Re-
lated to Armed Conflict with Non-state Groups, in PRISONERS IN WAR 251 (Sibylle Scheipers 
ed., 2010). 
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procedural rules exclude the possibility that there might be an alternative 
source for such a legal basis. 
 
B. Lethal Targeting and Detention in NIACs 
 
In the previous Section we have shown that neither the terms nor the pur-
pose of CA3 and AP II are incompatible with the existence of a legal au-
thority to detain persons in a NIAC based on their battlefield status. Alt-
hough the language of CA3 and AP II suggests that these rules do not 
themselves provide an implicit legal basis for detention, in the light of the 
considerations set out in the previous Section, it is reasonable to read them 
as being based on an assumption that some implied authority to detain in 
NIACs does exist. However, at this point some may object that the forego-
ing considerations, although applicable and well-established in the case of 
international armed conflicts, do not apply with the same force to NI-
ACs.164 Of course, the legal framework governing the two types of armed 
conflicts is different. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that human 
rights considerations may apply with greater urgency in NIACs.165 As the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has observed in the La 
Tablada case, it is “during situations of internal armed conflict” that interna-
tional human rights law and the law of armed conflict “most converge and 
reinforce each other.”166 Notwithstanding these and other differences be-
tween international and non-international armed conflicts, the key point for 
                                                                                                                      
164. E.g., Peter Rowe, Is there a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces During a 
Non-International Armed Conflict?, 61 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTER-
LY 697, 701–2 (2012). Ryan Goodman has argued that “if States have authority to engage 
in particular practices in an international armed conflict (e.g., targeting direct participants 
in hostilities), they a fortiori possess the authority to undertake those practices in non-
international conflict.” Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 50 (2009). Bearing in mind the differ-
ent character and trajectories of international and non-international armed conflicts, such 
a broad analogy goes too far. The authority to undertake particular practices in a NIAC 
cannot be derived from the corresponding authority available in international armed con-
flict by simple analogy. Rather, it must be derived from the regulation of the particular 
practice in question by the law of armed conflict applicable in NIACs, as we do in the 
present section. 
165. E.g., Draper, supra note 136, at 205; Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A 
Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 1, 34 (2004); Garraway, supra note 133, at 503. 
166. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Amer. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 ¶ 160 (1997). 
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our purposes is that the principle of military necessity underlies the law of 
armed conflict applicable in both types of conflicts. This can be illustrated 
from two perspectives. 
 
1. Military Necessity in NIACs 
 
International human rights law recognizes that the right to life is not abso-
lute, but subject to certain exceptions. Under Article 2(2)(c) of the ECHR 
the deprivation of life is not unlawful when it results from the use of force 
which is no more than absolutely necessary “in action lawfully taken for the 
purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” Although the use of lethal force 
pursuant to this provision remains tied to the law enforcement standard of 
“absolute necessity,” critically, it implies that quelling a riot or insurrection 
constitutes a legitimate aim for the use of force by the Contracting Par-
ties.167 Once the violence reaches the requisite level of intensity and organi-
zation,168 the rules of the law of armed conflict in NIAC become applicable 
to the situation.169 There is no reason why the use of lethal force for the 
                                                                                                                      
167. Stewart v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10044/82, 39 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 162, ¶ 27 (1984); Güleç v. Turkey, App. No. 21593/93, 28 E.H.R.R. 121, ¶ 71 (1998); 
Finogenov and Others v. Russia, App. Nos 18299/03, 27311/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 218 
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108231#{"itemid": 
["001-108231"]}. See LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CONFLICT 
AND TERRORISM 169–71 (2011); DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 232–33 (3d ed. 2014). 
168. Concerning this threshold, see SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 164–210; 
YORAM DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
37–57 (2014). For a human rights-based argument in favor of a higher threshold of appli-
cation de lege ferenda, see David Kretzmer, Rethinking the Application of IHL in Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 8 (2009). 
169. Annyssa Bellal & Louise Doswald-Beck, Evaluating the Use of Force During the Arab 
Spring, 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 32 (2011). The law of 
armed conflict becomes applicable regardless of which party has caused the escalation in 
violence. However, as a matter of international human rights law, a State may not take 
measures which unilaterally escalate the violence to the level of a non-international armed 
conflict, as this would by definition amount to an unnecessary and disproportionate use of 
lethal force. In other words, the right to quell a riot or insurrection does not permit States 
to unilaterally create an armed conflict. See id. at 19. Indeed, measures taken to quell a riot 
must be aimed at “calming the violent behaviour” of the demonstrators. Solomou v. Tur-
key, App. No. 36832/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 78 (2008). See also Isaak v. Turkey, App. No. 
44587/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 118 (2008). It has therefore been suggested that international 
human rights establishes a jus ad bellum of sorts for internal armed conflicts. See ELIAV 
 
 
 
Targeting and Detention in NIACs Vol. 91 
99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
purposes of quelling the insurrection should suddenly cease to be a legiti-
mate aim.170 On the contrary, since the applicability of the law of armed 
conflict is triggered by an escalation of the level of violence, there is every 
reason to believe that the use of lethal force is now more, rather than less, 
necessary from the perspective of Article 2(2). If the ECHR admits that the 
use of lethal force is, in principle, necessary and legitimate in such circum-
stances, it is difficult to see why the law of armed conflict applicable in 
NIACs should not do likewise and give effect to this according to its own 
rules.171 This point is supported by the fact that the principle of military 
necessity reflects “the sovereign right of a State to take measures in the de-
fence of its vital interests.”172 Although there is no single rule codifying a 
State’s right to use armed force in self-defense in its internal affairs,173 in-
ternational law recognizes that States do have a fundamental right to sur-
vival.174 In so far as this right permits the use of force to ensure the State’s 
survival against internal threats,175 we should expect to see it reflected in the 
rules of the law of armed conflict governing the conduct of hostilities in 
NIACs. 
In fact, these rules, in particular the rules governing targeting, confirm 
that the permissive dimension of the principle of military necessity applies 
in NIACs. In recent years, the convergence between international human 
                                                                                                                      
LIEBLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CIVIL WARS: INTERVENTION AND CONSENT 156–
57 (2013). 
170. Cf. William A. Schabas, The Right to Life, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 141, at 365, 385.   
171. Accordingly, with the applicability of the law of armed conflict (see supra note 
169), the State in question now may quell the riot or insurrection pursuant to the conduct 
of hostilities paradigm. See Melzer, supra note 118, 243–99. 
172. McCoubrey, supra note 146, at 217. 
173. The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by Article 
51 of the UN Charter is available to States only in their international relations, meaning 
that the armed attack triggering the right of self-defense must be of an international char-
acter. As such, it is not available against purely internal attacks which do not entail the 
involvement of external actors. See TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF 
THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 368–510 (2010). 
174. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 95. Cf. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 41–44 (1963). 
175. It is generally admitted that States enjoy the right to put down a rebellion or in-
surgency. See, e.g., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 126, at 36; 
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 60 (2002); OLIVIER CORTEN, 
THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 127–29 (2010); DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CON-
FLICTS, supra note 168, at 5. 
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rights law and the law of armed conflict has been accompanied by a grow-
ing convergence between the two branches of the law of armed conflict 
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts.176 The 
two processes are in fact related.177 In Tadić, the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia identified the development of human 
rights doctrines as one of the factors driving the extension of the rules and 
principles of the law of armed conflict designed for international armed 
conflicts into the sphere of non-international armed conflicts.178 According 
to the Tribunal, customary rules analogous to those applicable in interna-
tional armed conflict have developed to govern NIACs in such areas as the 
protection of civilians from hostilities and the prohibition of certain means 
and methods of warfare.179 Indeed, convergence extends to targeting. 
Neither CA3 nor AP II accord immunity from attack to persons who 
directly or actively participate in hostilities.180 Bearing in mind the dual 
character of the law of armed conflict, the reason for this lack of protection 
is, quite obviously, that such persons are treated as legitimate objectives of 
attack. However, as in the case of detention, the difficulty is that neither 
CA3 nor AP II confers an explicit right on States to attack insurgent fight-
ers and civilians directly participating in hostilities. Nonetheless, their lan-
guage suggests that such a right was implied by the drafters. First, AP II 
distinguishes between “persons” who benefit from fundamental guarantees 
under Article 4 and “civilians” who enjoy general protection against the 
dangers arising from military operations under Article 13. Since the con-
cept of a “person” is broader than the concept of a “civilian,” the natural 
meaning of these words suggests that “persons” include civilians and non-
civilians, that is, fighters. Second, Article 4(1) affords fundamental guaran-
tees to two groups: “persons who do not take a direct part” in hostilities 
and persons “who have ceased to take part in hostilities.” The first group 
can only refer to innocent civilians who have not taken up arms since 
                                                                                                                      
176. See Emily Crawford, Blurring the Lines between International and Non-International 
Armed Conflicts: The Evolution of Customary International Law Applicable in Internal Armed Con-
flicts, 15 AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 29 (2008); DINSTEIN, NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 168, at 211–19. 
177. Cf. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 99. 
178. Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 66, ¶ 97. 
179. Id., ¶ 127. 
180. Only “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities” benefit from the protec-
tions afforded by CA3(1), while Article 4(1) of AP II limits the fundamental guarantees set 
out in that provision to “persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take 
part in hostilities.” 
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fighters by definition take a direct part in hostilities. The second group 
must therefore logically refer to civilians who have ceased to take a direct 
part in hostilities and to fighters who are hors de combat.181 Two points fol-
low from this. Insurgent fighters are not civilians and do not become civil-
ians upon ceasing to take part in hostilities; otherwise the word “persons” 
would not have been used in preference of “civilians.” Fighters do not 
benefit from fundamental guarantees unless they have ceased to take part 
in hostilities by becoming hors de combat. In this respect, AP II mirrors the 
treatment of combatants in international armed conflict. 
Even if this textual interpretation is not considered conclusive, it is 
hardly conceivable, reading the relevant provisions against their context,182 
that the drafters of CA3 and AP II meant to treat everyone in a NIAC as a 
civilian and did not foresee the status-based targeting of insurgent fight-
ers.183 As the commentary on CA3 notes, “it must be recognized that the 
                                                                                                                      
181. Both of these points are confirmed by the negotiating history of AP II. Part II of 
the draft text prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which served as 
the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the adoption of AP II, dealt 
with the humane treatment of persons in the power of the parties to the conflict. Draft 
Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 1973, in 1 OFFICIAL REC-
ORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS pt. III 
(1978). Article 6 of the draft set out the fundamental guarantees which eventually became 
Article 4 of AP II. Article 7 of the draft afforded various protections to enemy hors de com-
bat “in accordance with Article 6.” The relationship between Articles 6 and 7 and subse-
quent discussion during the drafting process confirm that the word “persons” used in 
Article 6 was intended to include enemy fighters. See 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIP-
LOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 323–24, 332, 336 
(1978). Article 7 of the draft (which during the negotiations became Article 22bis) was 
eventually deleted. However, it was recognized that enemy personnel hors de combat were 
still covered by the fundamental guarantees in Article 6 of the draft. See id. at 335; 4 OFFI-
CIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CON-
FLICTS  ix (1978)). 
182. In line with the general rule of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties Article 31(1)–(2), the terms of CA3 and AP II must be interpreted 
in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and AP II, respectively. 
183. Treating everyone as a civilian in NIACs would render the principle of distinc-
tion meaningless and inoperable. Marco Sassòli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship between 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and In-
ternment of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE 
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conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on ei-
ther side engaged in hostilities—conflicts, in short, which are in many re-
spects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of 
a single country.”184 In fact, the commentary to AP II observes that mem-
bers of organized armed groups “may be attacked at any time.”185 Similarly, 
in the La Tablada case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
recognized that  
when civilians, such as those who attacked the Tablada base, assume the 
role of combatants by directly taking part in fighting, whether singly or as 
a member of a group, they thereby become legitimate military targets. As 
such, they are subject to direct individualized attack to the same extent as 
combatants. . . . When they attacked the La Tablada base, those persons in-
volved clearly assumed the risk of a military response by the State.186 
Meanwhile, the principal rules of the law of armed conflict governing 
targeting in international armed conflicts have passed into customary inter-
national law so as to now govern targeting in NIACs.187 Underlying this 
development is, first, the notion that members of organized armed groups 
and civilians directly participating in hostilities are fighters and, second, that 
such persons constitute legitimate military objectives.188 In line with the 
principle of distinction, attacks may only be directed against such persons. 
As the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law issued by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) illustrates,189 the interplay between humanity and mili-
tary necessity channels the use of lethal force in the same way in NIACs as 
                                                                                                                      
RED CROSS 599, 607 (2008). See also Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, Two Sides of the Combat-
ant Coin: Untangling Direct Participation in Hostilities from Belligerent Status in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 33 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
313, 329–30 (2011). 
184. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 126, at 36 (emphasis 
added). 
185. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 126, ¶ 4789. 
186. Abella v. Argentina, supra note 166, ¶¶ 178–79 (emphasis in original). 
187. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 336–86; BOOTHBY, supra note 134, at 440–50. 
Cf. UK MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 137, ¶¶ 15.6, 15.9.1. 
188. Both points are now well-established in State practice, as reflected in authorita-
tive restatements of the law. E.g., 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
supra note 161, pt. I; MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DIN-
STEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH 
COMMENTARY rr. 1.1.2, 2.1.1 (2006), available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/ 
NIACManualIYBHR15th.pdf. 
189. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 159. 
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it does in international armed conflicts: it shelters civilians and those who 
are hors de combat from the adverse effects of war and permits States to con-
duct attacks against combatants/fighters and civilians directly participating 
in hostilities.190 The caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights con-
firms this conclusion. In Korbely, the Court accepted that, from the perspec-
tive of CA3, the leader of an armed group of insurgents who has not laid 
down his arms or otherwise expressed his clear intention to surrender must 
be considered as taking an active part in hostilities and therefore constitutes 
a combatant subject to attack.191 
 
2. An Inherent Right to Detain 
 
So far we have established that the principle of military necessity applies in 
NIACs and permits States to use lethal force to conduct hostilities. These 
points are critical in the present context. This is so because, as we have in-
dicated earlier, the government submitted “that the ability to detain insur-
gents, whilst hostilities are ongoing, is an essential corollary of the authori-
sation to kill them.”192 Leggatt J rejected this argument for the following 
reason:  
This argument justifies the capture of a person who may lawfully be 
killed. But it does not go further than that.193 It therefore does not begin 
to justify the detention policy operated by the UK in Afghanistan. In 
terms of the present case, the argument would justify the arrest of [Serdar 
Mohammed] on the assumed facts, in circumstances where he was be-
lieved to represent an imminent threat. However, as soon as he had been 
detained and the use of lethal force against him could not be justified, the 
argument no longer provides a basis for his detention.194 
                                                                                                                      
190. Cf. Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 
in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 307, 308 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 
2009) (Vol. 85, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies); Corn & Jenks, supra 
note 183, at 325; Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 137, at 581, 595. 
191. Korbely v. Hungary, App. No. 9174/02, 50 E.H.R.R. 48, ¶¶ 89–94 (2010). 
Although in this case the Court was concerned with the principle that there can be no 
punishment without law as recognized by Article 7 of the ECHR, rather than the right to 
life pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, this makes no difference with regard to its 
findings concerning CA3. 
192. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 252. 
193. At this point, the judgment refers to DEBUF, supra note 127, at 389. 
194. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 253. 
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The logic of this argument is impeccable. If the authority to detain de-
rives from the authority to kill—on the basis that the right to deprive a 
person of his life must imply the right to inflict the lesser evil to detain him: 
a maiore ad minus—it follows that detention cannot be permissible in broad-
er circumstances than those governing killing. If killing is not permissible, 
then neither is detention. Where Leggatt J errs, with respect, is not the logic 
of the argument, but its opening premise. The law of armed conflict au-
thorizes States to attack two groups of persons: civilians directly participat-
ing in hostilities and members of organized armed groups carrying out a 
continuous combat function. The justification and conditions for attack 
differ in these two cases, as do the conditions governing their detention.195 
As regards the first group, CA3 and Article 13(3) of AP II stipulate that 
civilians lose their immunity from attack for such time as they are directly 
participating in hostilities. According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance to 
qualify as direct participation in hostilities, an act must satisfy three cumula-
tive criteria,196 known as the threshold of harm,197 direct causation198 and 
belligerent nexus.199 The details need not detain us here, except that the 
threshold of harm refers to harm of a “specifically military nature,” such as 
acts of sabotage.200 In contrast to the human rights standards on which 
Leggatt J seems to rely in the passage quoted above, CA3 and Article 13(3) 
therefore permit a person to be lawfully killed even where he or she does 
                                                                                                                      
195. Leggatt J’s reasoning closely follows that of DEBUF, supra note 127. Debuf denies 
that there is an inherent right to intern in NIACs. Id. at 464–86. She argues that the au-
thority to target civilians directly participating in hostilities does not include an authority to 
intern them after capture since at that point they will have regained their immunity from 
attack. Id. at 389. Although this is correct, she fails to consider that different considera-
tions apply to persons carrying out a continuous combat function since such persons are 
not civilians. See infra notes 202–8 and accompanying text. 
196. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 159, at 46–64. 
197. “In order to reach the required threshold of harm, a specific act must be likely to 
adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict 
or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected 
against direct attack.” Id. at 47. 
198. “In order for the requirement of direct causation to be satisfied, there must be a 
direct causal link between a specific act and the harm likely to result either from that act, 
or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part.” Id. 
at 51. 
199. “In order to meet the requirement of belligerent nexus, an act must be specifical-
ly designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the 
conflict and to the detriment of another.” Id. at 58. 
200. Id. at 47. 
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not present an “imminent threat” to life. Because such persons are civil-
ians, they are subject to attack only for the limited period that they are ac-
tively engaged in hostilities.201 Once they discontinue their direct engage-
ment for whatever reason, their temporary legal exposure to targeting 
comes to an end and their underlying immunity from attack is fully re-
stored.202 Consequently, if the direct participation of a civilian in hostilities 
comes to an effective end with his capture, he may no longer be subject to 
attack. As Leggatt J correctly recognized, if he may not be killed, he may 
not be detained on this basis either. 
The second group of persons consists of members of organized armed 
groups who carry out a continuous combat function. As the ICRC’s Inter-
pretive Guidance explains, organized armed groups are the armed forces, in a 
functional sense, of a non-State party to a NIAC.203 Since membership in 
insurgent forces has no basis in domestic law, the ICRC’s position is that 
“membership must depend on whether the continuous function assumed 
by an individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as a 
whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to 
the conflict.”204 Such a continuous combat function “requires lasting inte-
gration into an organized armed group.” For this reason, persons carrying 
out a continuous combat function cease to be civilians for as long as they 
remain members in the organized armed group by virtue of their continu-
ous combat function.205 During this time, they are legitimate military objec-
tives and may be targeted on the basis of their status alone, irrespective of 
whether they pose an imminent threat or not, just like combatant members 
of a State’s armed forces. The capture of a person carrying out a continu-
ous combat function does not, in itself, sever his lasting integration into the 
organized armed group to which he belongs.206 Accordingly, he does not 
                                                                                                                      
201. Id. at 70–71. This leads to a so-called “revolving door” of civilian protection, 
which has received considerable critical comment. E.g., Boothby, supra note 158, at 753–
58; Watkin, supra note 158, at 686–90. 
202. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 159, at 71. 
203. Id. at 32. 
204. Id. at 33. 
205. Id. at 71. See also id. at 27–28. 
206. According to the Interpretive Guidance, membership in an organized armed group 
on grounds of a continuous combat function ceases when the person disengages from 
carrying out such a function by means of conclusive behavior to this effect. See id. at 72. 
What constitutes such conclusive behavior is a matter of debate. See Boothby, supra note 
158, at 759–61. However, disengagement clearly requires more than a temporary lapse or 
inability in carrying out the continuous combat function. Otherwise there would be little 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2015 
106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
become a civilian merely by virtue of his capture.207 He remains a fighter 
subject, in principle, to direct attack for as long as his membership in the 
organized armed group continues. However, the authority to attack him is 
merely suspended during his detention, for persons who are hors de combat 
may not be made the subject of attack.208 The authority revives, however, 
as soon as he is no longer hors de combat, engages in hostile acts against his 
captors or attempts to escape.209 Consequently, the authority to kill persists 
for as long as membership in the organized armed group persists, although 
that authority is suspended following capture and during detention. Con-
trary to Leggatt J’s finding, the detaining State’s continued authority to kill 
a person carrying out a continuous combat function is therefore capable of 
serving as a legal basis for its authority to detain him.  
We should emphasize that humanitarian and operational considerations 
equally compel this conclusion. The authority to attack and the authority to 
detain are functionally linked. As in the case of combatants in an interna-
tional armed conflict,210 the internment of members of organized armed 
groups carrying out a continuous combat function is authorized to prevent 
them from returning to the battlefield in lieu of killing them.211 Detention 
thus gives effect to the principle of humanity: it is the lesser evil. However, 
a decision to detain also reflects military considerations. From an opera-
tional perspective, killing every single insurgent may not be necessary and, 
in fact, may well be counter-productive. Detention is often preferable to 
attack, since it permits the detaining State to gather intelligence and is more 
conducive to political reconciliation at the end of the conflict. Denying 
States engaged in a NIAC the authority to detain persons who carry out a 
continuous combat function for preventative reasons would frustrate these 
humanitarian and operational considerations. It would also have meant, for 
example in Afghanistan, that such persons could not be detained for more 
than 96 hours, but could be killed, in principle, immediately upon their re-
                                                                                                                      
to distinguish civilians participating directly in hostilities on a “revolving door” basis from 
fighters carrying out a continuous combat function and, therefore, between conduct-based 
and status-based distinction. See Corn & Jenks, supra note 183, at 341–44, passim. See also 
BOOTHBY, supra note 134, at 162. 
207. Cf. MOIR, supra note 175, at 60. 
208. This, of course, is stipulated in express terms in CA3. It also reflects customary 
international law. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 
161, r. 47. 
209. Id. 
210. DEBUF, supra note 127, at 228–30. 
211. Berman, supra note 125, at 9–10. 
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lease from that short period of detention. This is utterly absurd—and it is 
not what the law requires. 
Moreover, detention is accepted and well-established in NIACs as a 
matter of State practice. In this respect, Leggatt J seems to have underesti-
mated the significance of the Copenhagen Process Principles and Guide-
lines.212 These principles involve a multilateral attempt to formulate stand-
ards governing the treatment of individuals detained in NIACs. Important-
ly, the principles refer to the practice of detention on security grounds. 
Leggatt J held that this was of no weight, noting that the commentary ex-
plicitly states that the principles “cannot constitute a legal basis for deten-
tion.”213 Indeed, the participating States neither intended to create any new 
authorizations nor purported to recognize any practice as reflective of cus-
tomary law.214 This choice is readily understandable, for it reflects the im-
perative of not bestowing status or legitimacy upon belligerent non-State 
actors. Crucially, however, the principles do not exclude the possibility that 
such a legal basis already exists under international law.215 In fact, the 
“[p]articipants recognised that detention is a necessary, lawful and legiti-
mate means of achieving the objectives of international military opera-
tions.”216  
The terms, purpose and tone of the principles all suggest that the par-
ticipating States proceeded on the assumption that an authorization to de-
tain exists in international law. In this respect, it is important to note that 
the ICRC has recently expressed disagreement with Mohammed and en-
dorsed the existence of a legal basis for status-based operations in NIACs: 
The fact that Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions neither ex-
pressly mentions internment, nor elaborates on permissible grounds or 
process, has become a source of different positions on the legal basis for 
internment by States in an extraterritorial NIAC. One view is that a legal 
basis for internment would have to be explicit, as it is in the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention; in the absence of such a rule, IHL cannot provide it 
                                                                                                                      
212. Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, supra note 162. See Thomas Winkler, 
The Copenhagen Process on Detainees: A Necessity, 78 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 489 (2009); Bruce “Ossie” Oswald & Thomas Winkler, The Copenhagen Process: Princi-
ples and Guidelines on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, 83 NORDIC 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (2014). 
213. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 264–66. 
214. Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, supra note 162, cmt. ¶ 16.2.  
215. Id., princ. 16. 
216. Id., ¶ III. 
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implicitly.217 Another view, shared by the ICRC, is that both customary 
and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in this re-
spect be said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC. This posi-
tion is based on the fact that internment is a form of deprivation of liber-
ty which is a common occurrence in armed conflict, not prohibited by 
Common Article 3, and that Additional Protocol II—which has been rati-
fied by 167 States—refers explicitly to internment.218 
Finally, it is useful to recall that, according to information received by 
the Ministry of Defence, Mr. Mohammed was a senior Taliban command-
er.219 If correct, it seems likely that he qualified as an individual carrying out 
a continuous combat function. According to the Interpretive Guidance, “indi-
viduals whose continuous function involves the . . . command of acts or 
operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming a 
continuous combat function.”220 His detention by UK forces was therefore 
authorized under the law of armed conflict for such time as his member-
ship in the organized armed group to which he belonged continued.221 As 
we have shown, the legal basis for status-based detention is both implicit in 
the scheme of CA3 and AP II, as a necessary corollary of the implicit au-
thority to kill, and founded in customary law. 
 
C. Lex Specialis 
 
The final question that remains to be considered is whether the UK’s au-
thority to detain Mr. Mohammed under the law of armed conflict prevails 
over the conflicting obligation imposed on it by Article 5 of the ECHR. 
Before turning to Leggatt J’s reasons for denying that any authority to de-
                                                                                                                      
217. At this point, the Opinion Paper cites Mohammed, supra note 16. 
218. International Committee of the Red Cross, Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules 
and Challenges (Opinion Paper, Nov. 2014), available at https://www.icrc.org/en/ down-
load/file/1980/security-detention-position-paper-icrc-11-2014.pdf. See also Jelena Pejic & 
Cordula Droege, The Legal Regime Governing Treatment and Procedural Guarantees for Persons 
Detained in the Fight against Terrorism, in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAG-
MENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: MEETING THE CHALLENGES 527, 552–53 (La-
rissa van den Herik & Nico Schrijver eds., 2013). 
219. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 10. 
220. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 159, at 34. 
221. It should be clear from the foregoing analysis, but is worth underlining that the 
authority to detain in NIAC is limited: not every individual taking up arms in the so-called 
“war on terror” may be detained on this basis. See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a 
Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1169 (2011). 
A determination must be made on the facts of each individual case. 
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tain prevailed, it is useful to make a few more general points.  
 
1. Norm Conflict: Real or Apparent? 
 
In the present case, a normative conflict exists between the rules of the law 
of armed conflict and the European Convention. The law of armed conflict 
authorized the UK to detain Mr. Mohammed for preventative reasons on 
the basis of his membership in an organized armed group. However, Arti-
cle 5(1) of the European Convention stipulates that no one shall be de-
prived of his liberty save in the five exceptional circumstances listed in 
subparagraphs (a) to (f).  
As the European Court explained in Hassan, none of these permissible 
grounds of detention covers interment and preventative detention where 
there is no intention to bring criminal charges within a reasonable period of 
time.222 In fact, the Court took the firm view that detention of the kind 
foreseen under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions is not congru-
ent with any of the exceptions set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f).223 Not-
withstanding the Court’s position, it may be thought that there is no real 
conflict between these norms at all. The law of armed conflict merely per-
mits internment and preventative detention without actually imposing a 
duty on States to make use of it. The conflict between the two norms is 
therefore only an apparent one since it can be resolved quite easily by the 
States concerned themselves: they merely have to refrain from exercising 
their authority to intern in favor of the prohibition contained in Article 5 of 
the Convention. Indeed, this is what the European Court seemed to imply 
in Al-Jedda.224 However, this is not an attractive approach.  
First, it would bring about the complete humanization of the rules gov-
erning the conduct of warfare. The law of armed conflict imposes an ex-
tensive set of obligations on States, and also grants them certain authoriza-
tions. However, these authorizations, for example the right to attack or to 
intern enemy combatants, are formulated as permissions, not as obliga-
tions. No State is bound by the law of armed conflict to engage in status-
based operations. Consequently, if we were to deny that a norm conflict 
may arise between authorizations and obligations, States would have to 
forego any of the authorizations granted by the law of armed conflict 
                                                                                                                      
222. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 97. 
223. Id. 
224. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 107. Cf. Krieger, supra note 12, at 426–
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where these are inconsistent with their human rights obligations. When 
faced with a more permissive and a stricter rule of either international hu-
man rights law or the law of armed conflict, the same logic would also 
compel States to comply with the stricter rule. As a result, the conduct of 
warfare would be governed in its entirety by prohibitions of the most re-
strictive kind. As we have suggested earlier, this is undesirable as it drives 
the convergence between the two legal regimes too far.225 Domestic law is 
incapable of reversing this outcome. No State may invoke its domestic law 
as a justification for its failure to perform its treaty obligations.226 Conse-
quently, States may not rely on any authorizations to conduct hostilities 
granted under their domestic law where such authorizations conflict with 
their international human rights obligations. 
Second, this restrictive approach is not supported by the law. It is per-
fectly possible for norm conflicts to arise between authorizations and obli-
gations.227 A norm may authorize a State to engage in a certain conduct, 
while a different norm may prohibit it from performing that same conduct. 
In such cases, a conflict exists if the authorization is a strong one in the 
sense of a Hohfeldian privilege or liberty.228 The hallmark of such liberties 
is that the authorization (a permission to do X) is not restricted by a con-
flicting obligation (a duty to refrain from doing X). It is clear that the per-
missive aspect of the principle of military necessity confers such Hohfeldi-
an liberties on States party to an armed conflict within the framework of the 
law of armed conflict.229  
However, do the authorizations granted by the law of armed conflict 
also retain their character as Hohfeldian liberties when they meet re-
strictions imposed by international human rights law? Put differently: do 
law of armed conflict authorizations prevail over human rights law obliga-
tions? To our mind, international practice suggests that the answer is af-
firmative. It is now well-established that the relationship between the law 
of armed conflict and international human rights law is governed by the lex 
                                                                                                                      
225. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
226. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, art. 27. See Kirsten 
Schmalenbach, Article 27: Internal Law and Observance of Treaties, in VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 453 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach 
eds., 2012). 
227. See Erich Vranes, The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in International Law and Legal 
Theory, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 395 (2006). 
228. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL 16, 32–44 (1913). 
229. Hayashi, Military Necessity as Normative Indifference, supra note 147, at 684. 
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specialis principle.230 Putting aside for a moment the questions surrounding 
its meaning and legal effect,231 the widespread reliance on the principle 
demonstrates that States and international courts do not take the view that 
human rights norms simply override the rules of the law of armed conflict. 
As others have shown, international courts try to resolve conflicts between 
the two legal regimes through harmonious interpretation and other means, 
rather than admit that rule prevails over the other.232 
However, where such conflict avoidance is not possible, in particular in 
the context of status-based operations,233 we believe that the consistent and 
widespread conduct of such operations in contemporary State practice 
demonstrates that the conflict is to be resolved in favor of the authoriza-
tions contained in the law of armed conflict. If the adoption of the Addi-
tional Protocols of 1977 is “proof that a separate set of rules for armed 
conflicts is in fact what States want,”234 then the passing into customary 
international law of some of their principal provisions regulating the con-
                                                                                                                      
230. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 25. On the principle generally, see Anja 
Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 
74 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2005); Report of the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3, Aug. 
11, 2006, at 34–64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
231. The application of the principle in the present context has not passed without 
criticism. See Nancy Prud’homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifac-
eted Relationship, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 357 (2007); Marko Milanović, The Lost Origins of 
Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and International Humanitarian 
Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens 
David Ohlin ed., forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957. According 
to Milanović, “[t]he appeal of lex specialis lies in the veneer of antiquity of its Latin formula, 
in its apparent formality, simplicity and objectivity. But all it really does is disguise a series 
of policy judgments about what outcomes are the most sensible, realistic and practicable in 
any given situation.” Id. at 30. Milanović may be right about the veneer of antiquity, but 
ultimately it is of little consequence by what name we call the principle. However, to dis-
miss it as a mere instrument of policy judgment wrongly denies its value as a tool of formal 
legal reasoning and means for expressing legal choices made by States. 
232. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 237–74 (2003); 
Marko Milanović, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 69, 73 (2009); Marko Milanović, 
A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Hu-
man Rights Law, 14 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 459, 468–70 (2009). 
233. See supra note 22. 
234. Dietrich Schindler, The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights, 19 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 3, 14 (1979). 
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duct of hostilities for both international and non-international armed con-
flicts is proof that the States still want the core distinguishing features of 
this set of rules to prevail. 
 
2. Applying the Lex Specialis Principle 
 
Leggatt J took a different view. In response to the government’s submis-
sion that Article 5 of the Convention was displaced or qualified through 
the operation of the lex specialis principle, he distinguished three different 
understandings of the principle—strong, weaker and modest—based on 
the varying strength of their intended legal effects.235 The strong version of 
lex specialis holds that the law of armed conflict displaces international hu-
man rights law in its entirety in times of armed conflict.236 This total dis-
placement thesis does not reflect the prevailing view in international prac-
tice237 and was given short shrift by Leggatt J in the present case.238  
The modest version suggests that lex specialis should be used as a prin-
ciple of interpretation. Notwithstanding their structural differences, inter-
national humanitarian and human rights law are complementary in many 
respects.239 The principle of lex specialis draws on this natural complementa-
rity in an attempt to interpret and apply the two legal regimes in a manner 
which renders them mutually reinforcing. In some cases, such an interpre-
tative approach is capable of avoiding norm conflicts. This is how the ICJ 
used the principle in its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case. Hav-
ing noted that the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life pursuant 
to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) continues to apply, in principle, in times of armed conflict, the 
Court declared that “[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life . . . 
falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applica-
ble in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostili-
ties.”240 More recently, the UN Human Rights Committee applied the prin-
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ciple in a similar fashion to declare that “[s]ecurity detention authorized 
and regulated by and complying with the law of armed conflict in principle 
is not arbitrary” under Article 9 of the Covenant.241 However, this modest 
version of the lex specialis principle is of no assistance in the present case. In 
contrast to the more compliant language found in the ICCPR, Article 5 of 
the ECHR sets out an exhaustive list of permissible grounds for detention 
and defines them in exact terms. This leaves virtually no scope for applying 
the principle of harmonious interpretation, as Leggatt J found.  
The solution may lie with the weaker understanding of lex specialis as a 
principle designed to resolve conflicts between two opposing norms by 
giving effect to the specific rule over the more general one.242 Applying this 
principle to the present case means that the rules of detention designed 
specifically for armed conflict would prevail over the generally applicable 
provisions of Article 5. However, Leggatt J held that the application of this 
version of the lex specialis principle was foreclosed by ECHR Article 15, 
which provides States with a tailor-made mechanism to resolve potential 
conflicts between the law of armed conflict and the Convention.243 In his 
view, “the only way in which the European Court or a national court re-
quired to apply Convention rights can hold that IHL prevails over Article 5 
is by applying the provisions for derogation contained in the Convention 
itself, and not by invoking the principle of lex specialis.”244 In the wake of 
European Court’s judgment in Hassan, this position no longer reflects the 
law. 
In Hassan, the Court conceded a number of significant points. First, it 
                                                                                                                      
241. U.N. Human Rights Committee, supra note 161, ¶ 64. However, note that the 
Committee draws a distinction between international and non-international armed con-
flicts. In the former, the procedural rules of the law of armed conflict help to mitigate the 
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confirmed that the ECHR must be interpreted in harmony with other rules 
of international law, including those of the law of armed conflict, and took 
note of the ICJ’s caselaw on the subject.245 Second, it accepted the British 
government’s contention that the absence of derogations made by a re-
spondent State under Article 15 did not prevent the Court from relying on 
the law of armed conflict for the purposes of such harmonious interpreta-
tion. Article 15 enables the Contracting Parties to take measures derogating 
from their obligations under the Convention in “time of war or other pub-
lic emergency threatening the life of the nation.”246 Earlier cases seemed to 
suggest that the Court would not have recourse to the law of armed con-
flict explicitly and of its own accord unless respondent States made use of 
Article 15. In Isayeva,247 for example, the Court assessed Russian military 
operations in the Second Chechen War against what it called the “normal 
legal background” of peacetime law enforcement.248 In making this assess-
ment in the context of the exceptional circumstances prevailing in Chech-
nya, the Court drew inspiration from the relevant rules of the law of armed 
conflict, in particular those governing precautions in attack.249 At no point, 
however, did it rely on these rules expressly, identify their source or address 
their relationship with the Convention.250 Third, the Court accepted that 
                                                                                                                      
245. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 102. The Court here recalled its early finding in Varnava 
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the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions confer “powers” upon States in 
an international armed conflict, including in relation to the detention of 
persons for imperative reasons of security.251 Finally, it held that the terms 
of Article 5 of the Convention should be “accommodated,” as far as possi-
ble, with the power to intern or detain persons under the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions:252  
By reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by international 
humanitarian law and by the Convention in time of armed conflict, the 
grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) 
to (f) of [Article 5 of the ECHR] should be accommodated, as far as pos-
sible, with the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians 
who pose a risk to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conven-
tions.253 
These considerations apply with equal force in the present case. First, 
the UK’s authority to detain Mr. Mohammed derives from its authority to 
expose him to lethal attack. This engages the prohibition of the intentional 
deprivation of life under Article 2 of the Convention. As the European 
Court held in Varnava, the duty of harmonious interpretation applies to 
Article 2 as well.254 Consequently, if Hassan holds that the right to liberty is 
qualified by the power to detain in armed conflict; this suggests that the 
right to life must be qualified by the power to attack combatants and civil-
ians directly participating in hostilities. Second, in Hassan, the Court care-
fully limited its judgment to international armed conflicts: 
The Court is mindful of the fact that internment in peacetime does not 
fall within the scheme of deprivation of liberty governed by Article 5 of 
the Convention without the exercise of the power of derogation under 
Article 15 (see paragraph 97 above). It can only be in cases of interna-
tional armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners of war and the deten-
tion of civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted features of in-
ternational humanitarian law, that Article 5 could be interpreted as per-
mitting the exercise of such broad powers.255 
As we have shown, the conduct of status-based operations is an ac-
cepted and well-established feature not only of international armed con-
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flicts, but also of NIACs. Consequently, while the facts and precedential 
value of Hassan are limited to international armed conflicts, the underlying 
reasoning applies, despite the European Court’s hesitation, to NIACs too. 
In fact, as we pointed out earlier, the permissibility of using lethal force to 
quell a riot or insurrection is recognized by Article 2(2)(c) of the Conven-
tion. Moreover, Article 15(2) of the ECHR specifically permits derogations 
from the right to life “in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of 
war.” Causing the death of a member of an organized armed group carry-
ing out a continuous combat function is a lawful act of war in accordance 
with the CA3, AP II and customary international law. If causing such a 
death is a permissible ground for derogation, it must also be a sufficient 
ground for accommodating the authority to conduct such a lethal attack, as 
well as the implied power to detain the target, with Articles 2 and 5 of the 
Convention. Finally, the added benefit of such an approach is that it brings 
the interpretation of the European Convention in line with the interpreta-
tion of the ICCPR in the jurisprudence of the ICJ and the UN Human 
Rights Committee.256 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In Mohammed, the English High Court issued a general challenge to the law-
fulness of status-based operations in NIACs under international law. Ac-
cording to the judgment, absent express derogation, the more stringent 
standards of international human rights law apply as the sole legal frame-
work. By wrongly applying the law of armed conflict and subverting its 
core principles, this conclusion pushes convergence to the point of legal 
and operational absurdity. We submit that, contrary to Leggatt J’s under-
standing, a legal basis for the detention of Mr. Mohammed on security 
grounds may be found in Security Council Resolution 1890 and in both 
treaty and customary law of armed conflict applicable in NIACs. As re-
gards the latter, the legal authority for status-based detention is implicit in 
the scheme of CA3 and AP II, as a necessary corollary of the implicit au-
thority to kill, and found in customary law, as reflected by established prac-
tice. 
As regards the question of Security Council authorization, which we 
examined in Section III, the High Court erred in finding that Article 103 of 
the Charter was inapplicable. Its central mistake was to construe ISAF’s 
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mandate too narrowly, through the prism of a law enforcement paradigm. 
On its proper construction, taking into account the well-established mean-
ing of the phrase “all necessary measures” and ISAF’s mandate as spelled 
out in previous resolutions, Resolution 1890 authorized ISAF to operate 
pursuant to a conduct of hostilities paradigm. As a result, ISAF was not 
limited to the use of force against individuals representing an imminent 
threat. Rather, notwithstanding the absence of specific express authoriza-
tion, ISAF was permitted to engage in both lethal and non-lethal status-
based operations, including targeting. Leggatt J’s demanding understanding 
of the requirement for “clear and explicit” language fails to apply the inter-
pretative principles set down by the ICJ. It pushes the European Court’s 
reasoning in Al-Jedda too far by inappropriately seeking to impose more 
exacting conditions upon the Security Council’s authorization of force un-
der Chapter VII. 
In Section IV, we demonstrated that permission to conduct status-
based operations also exists under the law of armed conflict, both in inter-
national and in non-international armed conflicts. Leggatt J, however, over-
looked three important principles. First, the insistence on an express basis 
for detention and/or detailed safeguards in AP II reflects an overly positiv-
ist approach which fails to appreciate the true reason for the paucity of 
treaty law applicable in NIAC, and leaves insufficient room for the possi-
bility of a legal basis either implicit in CA3 and AP II or under customary 
law. The inability of States to agree on binding rules establishing grounds 
or safeguards for status-based operations in NIACs reflects their fear of 
impliedly conferring status or legitimacy upon belligerent non-State actors. 
However, this does not detract from the fact that the conduct of status-
based operations is an accepted and well-established feature of NIACs. The 
Copenhagen principles provide evidence of the practice of extended deten-
tion on security grounds.  
Second, by ascribing to CA3 and AP II an exclusively humanitarian 
purpose, Leggatt J disregarded the equally important counterbalancing 
structural principle and legitimate aim of military necessity. This principle, 
which reflects international law’s acknowledgment of the State’s fundamen-
tal right to survival, permeates the law of armed conflict and also finds 
recognition in international human rights law. Practice confirms that the 
law relating to targeting in international armed conflict, which gives expres-
sion to the means of national survival, applies equally in NIACs. Any anal-
ysis of the relationship between human rights law and the law of armed 
conflict which fails to address this aspect of convergence is incomplete.  
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Third, Leggatt J failed to acknowledge the key distinction between dif-
ferent categories of individuals engaged in hostilities in NIACs on behalf of 
non-State actors. An exclusive focus on the law enforcement paradigm and 
the equal protection of individuals under human rights law led him to over-
look the significance in the law of armed conflict of the enduring status of 
members of organized armed groups who carry out a continuous combat 
function. States engaged in NIACs are permitted to kill or, as a necessary 
corollary, capture and detain such persons for as long as they remain a 
member of the group pursuant to either CA3 and AP II or customary in-
ternational law.  
The Mohammed judgment provides a crystal ball through which to assess 
the future relationship between international human rights law and the law 
of armed conflict according to the total convergence thesis. It paints a bi-
zarre battlefield landscape in which status-based operations in NIACs are 
prohibited. This highlights the dangers resulting from a failure to fully ap-
preciate the foundational principles of the law of armed conflict and the 
ways in which this branch of law differs from human rights in its structure, 
design and objectives. In our view, the authorization to conduct status-
based operations under the customary law of armed conflict applicable in 
NIACs prevails, as the lex specialis, over more stringent human rights stand-
ards. As the European Court accepted in Hassan, albeit with respect to in-
ternational armed conflicts, this result is precluded neither by the specificity 
of the ECHR’s wording nor by the possibility of derogation. Once it is 
recognized that detention and targeting are accepted features of NIACs, 
the same reasoning applies with equal force. Mohammed is currently pending 
before the Court of Appeal and the case is widely expected to reach the 
Supreme Court and perhaps even the European Court. It is to be hoped 
that the higher courts will equip themselves with the foundational princi-
ples of the law of armed conflict and help move the global convergence 
debate onto a more conceptually stable and operationally sustainable 
course. 
